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This master’s thesis studies the link between ownership structures and CEO compensation in 
unlisted Norwegian shipping and sea transport firms. The objective is to examine differences in 
total pay and pay-performance sensitivity between owner and non-owner CEOs, and we test the 
predictions of CEO pay from two theories; agency theory and the managerial power perspective. 
We find evidence that non-owner CEOs receive significantly higher compensation than owners, 
between 39 % and 47 % on the average. Furthermore, compensation decreases with the 
ownership percentage, which indicates that ownership shares can be used as a substitute for 
cash compensation and to reduce agency problems. There is some evidence that firm 
performance, measured by EBIT growth, affect the compensation of non-owners. This indicates 
that non-owners have a higher pay-performance sensitivity than owners. Overall, predictions 
from agency theory fits our data better than the managerial power perspective. 
 
To get additional insights into the dynamics of top executive compensation, we surveyed the 
CEOs in the dataset. The survey reveals that non-owners to a greater extent receive 
performance-based pay compared to owners. Most non-owners believe the compensation gap 
is due to the owners’ possibility of replacing their salary with dividend payments. However, 
owners mostly claim that they rarely or never pay out dividends instead of salary. They believe 
that inner motivation, cautiousness, and commitment to the firm can explain the pay gap. There 
are some findings from our survey that highlights differences in motivation. Owners score 
somewhat higher on intrinsic motivation, while non-owners are more motivated by extrinsic 
factors.   
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1. Introduction 
The compensation of Chief executive officers (CEO) is a heavily discussed topic. Many have 
tried explaining the forces behind the pay-setting process and discussed the fairness of large 
compensation plans. The CEO has much responsibility and their effort is essential for the 
company’s success. Executive compensation is a complex problem because the compensation 
plans need to assure that the actions of CEOs are in line with the firm’s best interest. There is a 
reason to expect significant differences between top executives, even within the same industry. 
Several possible explanations exist, but one fundamental factor is that some CEOs own the 
company, and others do not.  
 
The owner possesses more authority and power. Consequently, it is reasonable to think that an 
owner would construct self-serving payment plans that extract company value to private benefit. 
On the other hand, owners might be more intrinsically motivated than non-owners, and therefore 
put the company’s best interest above their compensation. The non-owner CEO has no personal 
investment in the firm and may need proper incentives in the form of higher compensation to 
be sufficiently motivated. Since the interests of the owners are more aligned with the 
performance of the firm, the difference in pay compared to non-owners allows us to examine 
how firms use compensation to solve incentive problems. We test two theories that try to explain 
the mechanisms above; agency theory and the managerial power perspective. Agency theory 
predicts higher pay of non-owners, and also that their pay is more sensitivity to firm 
performance. The managerial power perspective predicts higher pay for owners and that owners 
use their power to decouple pay from performance. These dynamics are the basis for our 
research question: 
“Are the compensation of non-owner CEOs higher, but more sensitive to 
firm performance compared to the compensation of owner CEOs?”.  
While most existing research on CEO compensation considers only listed firms, we examine 
unlisted companies in the Norwegian shipping and sea transport industry. We hope that our 
thesis can contribute to reducing the research gap between listed and unlisted companies. This 
is important to do because unlisted firms operate under other conditions than listed companies, 
that may impact corporate governance, investments, and the profitability of the firm (Berzins & 
Bøhren, 2009). 
 6
The approach of our study differs from existing literature by gathering a novel dataset on CEO 
compensation of unlisted firms. Our dataset is based on the financial statements of all firms in 
the Norwegian shipping industry. The industry gives us a reasonably even number of firms with 
owner and non-owner CEOs. Having a non-owner top executive may cause agency problems, 
and the solutions come with a cost. We study the difference in pay using OLS regressions, and 
we also estimate the incentive cost of compensating non-owner CEOs. We also examine the 
difference in pay sensitivity of owners and non-owners. The research is done by analyzing 413 
CEOs and firms. We use growth in EBIT, liquidity, and return on assets (ROA) as performance 
measures and assets as a proxy for firm size.  
We find that non-owners receive substantially more compensation than owners. The difference 
in 2017 and 2018 is 39 % and 47 % on the average. Also, we find some evidence that the pay-
performance sensitivity of non-owners is higher using growth in EBIT as a proxy for firm 
performance. This provides evidence in favor of agency theory as an explanation of CEO pay.  
Lastly, we conduct a survey on the top executives in our dataset to get a more thorough 
understanding of the dynamics of CEO compensation. The main finding is that non-owners to 
a much greater extent receive performance-based compensation, which contradicts studies 
internationally. Again, this fits with the predictions from agency theory. Nevertheless, both 
agency theory and the managerial power perspective predicts that the pay of owners is more 
detached from performance, which also fits with the findings in our survey. We discuss how 
social norms possibly put constraints on managerial power, which might explain why agency 
theory is better in explaining CEO pay in Norway than elsewhere.  
1.1 Hypotheses 
Our hypotheses are based on the theoretical frameworks and previous research presented in 
Section 3. It is reasonable to believe that ownership motivates increased effort to ensure growth 
in firm value. Because of this, the owner may not need to be compensated at the same level as 
the non-owner in order to be sufficiently motivated. An owner also enjoys the opportunity of 
dividend payments, further decreasing his needs for substantial cash compensation. According 
to agency theory, an owner will compensate himself at a level that maximizes his and the 
company’s utility. On the other hand, ownership gives the top executive more opportunities to 
increase own compensation, which is in line with the managerial power perspective. Agency 
theory further suggests that an agency problem occurs when separating management and 
control. Therefore, non-owner CEOs need to be adequately incentivized to act according to the 
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shareholders’ interests. We are surprised that most studies show higher compensation for 
owners. However, these findings are mainly from publicly traded companies outside Norway. 
We believe that firms need to pay a premium to incentivize leaders who do not have ownership 
shares. Our first hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 1: Non-owner CEOs are paid higher than owner CEOs.  
 
Risk-averse CEOs would prefer a fair amount of compensation decoupled from performance. 
The managerial power perspective suggests that owner CEOs use their power to negotiate 
lucrative contracts that serve own interests and not the other shareholders’. It is plausible that 
top executives with more power would scratch their own back by making their compensation 
more decoupled from performance. Non-owners may not be able to influence their pay 
composition in the same way as owners. Because of agency problems, the shareholders might 
be inclined to propose a contract that incentivizes performance and effort. With performance-
based incentives, a significant amount of the compensation plan will be in jeopardy if the firm 
performs poorly. These incentive mechanisms are the basis of our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The compensation of owner-CEOs is less sensitive to firm 
performance. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
We start by providing relevant definitions in Section 2. Section 3 presents theoretical 
frameworks and previous research on executive compensation. Our data collecting process is 
thoroughly discussed in Section 4, providing the reader with information about the nature of our 
dataset. The following chapter, Section 5, presents our research method and the models used in 
our study. Section 6 presents the results of our OLS analysis and related discussions. 
Furthermore, we discuss the findings of our survey and connect the answers to the results of the 
OLS analysis. Our conclusion is presented in Section 7. Lastly, we have included 
an Appendix that contains information, figures, and tables, providing a supplementary 
understanding of our findings and methods.  
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2. Definitions and background 
We first present relevant definitions and explanations of how we use certain words and phrases 
(Table 1). Further in this section, we will elaborate on the most important definitions and discuss 
why we chose to study the Norwegian shipping industry.  
 
Table 1 – Definitions  
Word/phrase Definition 
CEO The Chief Executive Officer, or the top executive. The person in charge of the 
daily operations of the firm  
Owner CEO A CEO with ownership shares in the company. Also referred to as just 
“owner(s)” 
Non-Owner CEO A CEO without ownership shares in the company. Also referred to as just 
“non-owner(s)” 
CEO pay  Or CEO compensation, is every form of CEO cash compensation, including 
salary, bonuses, and other forms of payments to the CEO 
Executive pay We use this term in the same context as “CEO pay” 
CEO salary Ordinary base salary 
Cash compensation Includes salary and bonuses 
The Board of directors  Also referred to as just “the board” or the BOD 
Chairman The head of the board (of directors). May also be referred to as the chairperson 
or chairwoman 
Shareholders The owners of the firm 
Listed firms Firms that are publicly traded on a stock exchange 
Unlisted firms Privately held companies - not publicly traded 
The Norwegian shipping 
industry 
Or sometimes just referred to as “The shipping industry”. Companies 
categorized as “Shipping and sea transport” on proff.no and regnskapstall.no 
 
The shareholders are the owners of the firm. Their stake in the company is determined by the 
number of shares owned. In order to become a shareholder, one pays the company the value of 
the shares. In return, the shareholders get rights and obligations as well as voting privileges at 
the general assembly (Altinn, n.d.a). Consequently, shareholders have the power to implement 
changes, pay out dividends, develop company strategies, and possess overall power over the 
management. If a shareholder owns more than 50 % of the company’s shares, the individual is 
defined as a majority shareholder. This means that the shareholder has the power to choose 
members of the board, and has control over the dividend payout for the company’s shareholders. 
By owning 2/3 of the shares, the shareholder possesses a qualified majority and essentially has 
total control over the firm regarding dividends, changes to the statutes, and capital changes. To 
be able to force the other shareholders into selling their shares, one must own 90 percent of the 
total shares in the company (Lund, 2013). 
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The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the person considered responsible for the company’s 
daily operations and management. A CEO can be in charge of both unlisted and listed 
companies. Unlisted firms are not required to appoint a CEO, and the chairman is responsible 
for daily operations and management in these situations (Brekke, 2019). Unlisted firms can have 
a contact person or business manager instead of a CEO, but none of these roles are required 
(Brønnøysundregistrene, n.d.). Publicly traded companies in Norway are required to appoint a 
CEO (Knudsen, 2018).  
 
A board of directors performs the overall management of the firm, and the CEO is subordinate 
to the board (Knudsen, 2018). The board of directors usually appoints the CEO (USLEGAL, 
n.d.), unless the CEO founds the company him or herself. Actual tasks of the board, and how 
they are structured, varies from company to company. Members of the board can be employees 
of the firm. Typically, large firms have an independent board with members that also hold 
various positions in other companies (USLEGAL, n.d.). The board is vital because it serves as 
a monitoring and evaluating unit concerning the performance of the CEO and the firm. 
 
The most crucial distinction between listed and unlisted firms is that listed firms are publicly 
traded at a stock exchange, while unlisted companies are privately held. These differences have 
implications for the ownership structure. Typically, publicly traded firms have more dispersed 
ownership with smaller owners, something that makes it more difficult to resolve agency 
conflicts (Schoenmaker & Schramade, 2019, p.88). However, no particular legal restrictions are 
preventing listed companies from having concentrated ownership (Sirnes & Knudsen, 2019).  
One other significant difference is the requirement of at least three people on the board in listed 
companies (Sirnes & Knudsen, 2019), as opposed to one for unlisted companies (Knudsen, 
2018).  Since unlisted firms are less regulated, and typically have more concentrated ownership, 
it is interesting to study how they resolve incentive issues. 
 
Listed firms are also subjected to stricter corporate governance regulations compared to unlisted 
firms. Listed companies are required by law to report and explain their practices and policies 
for corporate governance (The Norwegian Corporate Governance Board, 2018). Berzins and 
Bøhren (2009) set forth three conditions that separate the two types of firms. First, unlisted 
firms do not have access to a liquid equity market, nor a market for buying and selling of existing 
ownership. Second, minority owners in unlisted firms have lower legal protection. Lastly, 
unlisted companies are less transparent. The latter may be important in describing CEO 
compensation because the management and economy of unlisted companies are less 
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systematically evaluated by financial analysts and business journalists (Berzins & Bøhren, 
2009).  
The choice of the Norwegian shipping industry 
There are many unlisted shipping firms in Norway, which comply with our wish to narrow down 
the research gap between listed and unlisted firms. Alternatively, we could have studied a 
random sample of all Norwegian unlisted firms, but then we would not get any industry-specific 
insights. The shipping industry is relatively large and includes firms in all sizes. A significant 
number of shipping firms also have owner CEOs. Hence, we have two large groups of CEOs to 
compare with each other. When focusing on one industry, we are also able to go in-depth as 
opposed to having a shallow and general approach. The shipping industry is exposed to 
fluctuations in international markets because it relies a great deal on foreign trade. Its global 
dependence is appealing because a typical expectation is that executive pay varies with 
company performance. Moreover, we want to contribute with research on the pay-performance 
sensitivity of Norwegian CEOs. To our knowledge, Norwegian companies have not been used 
in this area of research before.  
 
There are several reasons why Norway is a particularly interesting country to research. Two 
distinctive features of Norway are low levels of inequality and somewhat novel social norms. 
These characteristics may have a direct implication on the owner’s willingness to compensate 
themselves. The ratio between executive pay and average salaries in Norway is not nearly at the 
same level as, for example, the ratio in the USA (Forsland, 2019), which in 2004 was as high 
as 500:1 (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004, p. 1). According to Lederne (2018), the wage of Norwegian 
leaders is just 30 % higher than the general average in Norway. The inequality levels highlight 
the socialistic ideas manifested in the Norwegian society. Therefore, the results from other parts 
of the world may not be replicated by studying Norwegian firms. 
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3. Theoretical frameworks and former research 
In this chapter, we are going to present theoretical frameworks relevant for explaining CEO pay. 
Our two main theories are Agency theory (Section 3.1) and the Managerial power 
perspective (Section 3.2). Furthermore, corporate governance could impact the compensation 
packages, and this will be discussed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 will discuss the market for CEOs. 
Moreover, we will present results from former relevant research in Section 3.5. 
3.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory is widely used to explain the behavior of the different players in an organization. 
The theory looks at the implications of separating ownership and control, and Adam Smith 
captured the core problem when he argued that one could not expect a manager who looked 
after other people’s money to do this with the: 
 
“…same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own.” 
 
     - Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations, 1776* 
 
*Quote and source are both presented in Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
 
3.1.1 Agency problems 
An agency relationship occurs in any situation where a principal engages one or more agents to 
perform a service on their behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308). In this thesis, we will 
address the agency relationship between the owners of a corporation and the top executive. The 
agency relationship occurs when the owner hires the CEO to perform the daily operations of the 
company (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004, p.17).  
 
Bounded rationality and self-interest are two main assumptions of the agency theory. Moreover, 
the theory claims that the owner and the manager have different cost-utility functions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 59). Hence, the manager is presumed to make decisions benefiting himself 
without regarding the consequences for the owners. If the choices made by the manager diverge 
from the owners’ path of interest, an agency problem occurs (Bebchuk and Fried (2004, p. 16). 
In the following, we will present the agency problems of conflicting interests, asymmetric 
information, and different risk aversion. 
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A manager making decisions on behalf of the owners is expected to encounter a range of choices 
regarding consumptions of perks, on the job effort, and business decisions.  The owner expects 
the manager to make decisions that maximize the owners’ utility. However, the manager may 
have private interests concerning his consumption and career that conflicts with the interest of 
the owner. Hence, a conflict of interest occurs (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004, p. 23).  
 
Conflict of interest is tightly connected to ownership and the utility maximization of the actors 
involved. If the manager is the sole owner of the company, he will make decisions regarding 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of the operation that maximizes his utility, and there will 
be no conflict of interest present. When the ownership fraction decreases, he will no longer 
receive the full wealth effect of the costs, and his preference for on the job consumption will 
change (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 316). Without the right incentive mechanisms, a manager 
who endures the full cost of his effort without completely relishing the wealth and benefits will 
exert an effort that is less than optimal (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004, p. 16). On the opposite side, 
if the manager enjoys the perks without bearing the costs, he will try to transfer the owners’ 
value over to himself. The manager achieves this by consuming more on the job than is agreed 
upon in his contract (Fama, 1980, p. 296). 
 
Another concern that arises in an agency relationship is the disparity in risk preferences between 
the owner and the CEO. Different opinions regarding risk could be problematic, as the two 
parties favor different actions (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58). Shareholders often have the opportunity 
to diversify their investment, and hence their risk associated with the firm. Because of this, they 
are generally considered to be risk-neutral. The CEO is not able to diversify his risk similarly. 
Consequently, his security is relying on the performance of the individual firm, making him 
risk-averse (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 60). This makes fixed pay more valuable for a CEO than 
performance-based pay. If the firm wants a larger fraction of performance-based compensation 
in their executive contracts, the compensation needs to be of a higher expected value than if the 
contract only consisted of fixed pay. This is to meet the reservation value of the CEO, i.e., the 
level of compensation that makes him or her accept the contract (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004, pp. 
19-20). However, an owner could also be risk-averse. If a risk-averse owner suspects that the 
CEO will act in self-interest, the owner may be willing to bear the necessary costs in order to 
reduce opportunistic behavior (Kultys, 2016, p. 619). This could influence how owners 
incentivizes the CEO. 
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The last, and perhaps, most fundamental problem of agency theory is the problem of asymmetric 
information. As the manager and the owner inhabit different roles in the organization, they 
obtain different information. The consequence of the separate streams of information is 
asymmetric information between the two parties, resulting in the parties being obliged to trust 
each other to provide them with necessary information (Busch, Vanebo & Dehlin, 2010, pp. 
132-133). Asymmetric information is problematic because it allows the manager to endure in 
opportunistic behavior (Busch et al., 2010, pp. 132-133). Williamson (1973, p. 317) define 
opportunism as the effort to realize individual gains through a deceiving behavior. An 
opportunistic manager will take advantage of the information that is unobservable for the owner 
and make decisions concerning the daily operations for his benefit at the expense of the owners 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004, p. 16).  
 
It is essential to be aware of two main issues arising from information asymmetries; hidden 
information and hidden actions (Busch et al., 2010, p. 134). In cases of hidden information, the 
agent has relevant information that the principal does not possess. Hidden information could 
occur during and after the hiring process. During the process, the CEO possesses information 
about his productivity, effort, and abilities. This results in adverse selection as the owner cannot 
adequately verify the productivity of the CEO upon hiring (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 61). If some 
information about the CEO’s productivity and skill is hidden, this could result in an ineffective 
and expensive contract. After the hiring process, hidden information could manifest in situations 
where the management has more knowledge about the prospects of the company compared to 
the shareholders (Snyder, Nicholson & Stewart, 2015, p. 474). 
 
Hidden actions occur after the hiring process. The shareholders seek to align the CEO’s interest 
with their own. However, it is both challenging and expensive to observe and monitor the CEO 
daily. Effort and executive decisions are examples of hidden actions made by the manager that 
may be difficult for the shareholders to observe (Snyder, Nicholson & Stewart, 2015, p. 474).  
Only the CEO knows the extent of effort that he exerts on the job. If the compensation is 
protected against poor outcomes, the CEO has fewer incentives to avoid them. Likewise, if the 
pay is decoupled from performance, the manager will maximize his utility by reducing his effort 
(Bolton & Dewatripont, 2005, p. 139). 
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3.1.2 Reducing the agency problem 
To reduce unwanted actions from the top executive, the owners must provide sufficient 
incentives and exert monitoring. Such measures come with a cost for the owner, and the agency 
theory refers to it as agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1979, p. 308) define agency costs as 
the sum of monitoring expenditures by the owner, the bonding expenditures by the agent, and 
the residual loss. The residual loss refers to the reduction in welfare experienced by the owner 
due to agency problems.  
 
To monitor the CEO, the owners implement a board of directors (BOD). The BOD becomes the 
intermediaries between the top executive and the owners. Their purpose is to ensure that the 
contract between the two parties is maintained. The board hires the CEO and follows up on the 
ongoing management by monitoring the CEO’s effort and performance. Furthermore, the board 
has the authority to intervene in the daily operations and replace the CEO if they find it 
necessary. Because the board is allowed to interact, it limits the possibility for the CEO to act 
in self-interest and thereby reduces the agency problem (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004, p. 17). 
 
In order to provide sufficient performance incentives, Bebchuk & Fried (2004, p. 7) strongly 
urges companies to use equity-based CEO compensation. Furthermore, they claim that there is 
little to no evidence of cash compensations working as proper incentives, especially when pay 
is decoupled from the performance. By designing the incentives correctly, the agent would be 
inclined to perform well because he will benefit significantly from success and become 
personally punished for poor performance. Consequently, to reduce the agency problems, the 
wage should be dependent on performance while also compensate for the cost of effort and 
provide a risk premium for the CEO. Gjesdal (1982, pp. 1-3) states that by making the 
remuneration a function of the managers’ actions, one can prompt Pareto efficient decision 
making and reduce the agency problem. This is accomplished by implementing incentive 
mechanisms into the contract. This can be illustrated by a theoretical model developed by 
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).  
A model of CEO compensation 
In the following, we will present a simplified version of the theoretical model presented by 
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, pp. 137-139). The model aims to explain CEO compensation 
grounded in agency theory, and it assumes that the owners only can observe the CEO’s effort 
by evaluating the company performance. Thus, the contract between the shareholders and the 
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CEO is linear, and the wage (w) consists of a fixed compensation level (a) and a performance 
component (b). Rj illustrates the measure of effort and performance:  𝑤 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑅' 
 
The fixed compensation level should reflect the value of knowledge and compensate for the 
cost of effort and the manager’s risk preference. The model continues to assume that the CEO’s 
performance (Q) is equivalent to the sum of output of the different task he or she performs (𝑞)), 
in addition to the effort (𝑒)) exerted in those tasks: 
 𝑄 = Σ)𝑞)(𝑒)) 
 
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, p. 137) claim that principals are risk neutral while the 
managers have a constant absolute risk-averse risk profile. The company seeks to maximize the 
CEO’s contribution (Qj) to the value creation, and the shareholders maximize their profit when 
the manager’s contribution to the firm equals his or her effort minus the pay: 
 𝑄' − 𝑤' = Σ)𝑞)(𝑒)) − 𝑤' 
 
For the CEO, on the other hand, the effort is associated with a cost of effort 𝐶(Σ𝑒)') and risk 
(𝛾(𝜎3456)). 𝑤' − 𝐶7Σ𝑒)'8 − 𝛾(𝜎3456) 
 
If the salary does not depend on effort, the CEO maximizes the salary by minimizing the 
effort.  
 
The company determines the combination of fixed and performance-based pay. For the 
shareholders, the optimal pay combination consists of a small portion of fixed pay, and a 
substantial portion of performance-based pay. The performance-based component reflects the 
incentive effect and involves less risk for the firm. With more performance-related pay, the 
CEO must bear a higher portion of the risk associated with the performance of the company. 
Since the CEO is assumed risk-averse, the risk premium will increase with the performance 
component (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, p. 139). The CEO will thus prefer a higher portion 
of fixed pay to decrease the individual risk. The optimal pay combination that satisfies both 





3.2 The Managerial Power Perspective  
We will now discuss another perspective of the pay-setting process, the managerial power 
perspective (MPP) proposed by Bebchuk and Fried (2004) as an alternative to agency 
theory. The perspective describes the power dynamics between the CEO and the board during 
the pay-setting process, whereas the board represents the owners. 
 
The managerial power perspective recognizes the agency problem that occurs due to the 
separation of ownership and control. However, where the agency theory focuses on CEO 
compensation being a solution to this problem, the managerial perspective regards the pay-
setting process itself to be a big part of the problem. Furthermore, the agency theory talks about 
creating a board of directors as a monitoring device for the owners. However, the MPP is 
hesitant to assume that the board does not act in self-interest when determining CEO 
compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004, pp. 61-62). 
 
The monitoring effect of the board of directors diminishes when the CEO has power over the 
very organ that determines his compensation. Optimal contract theory argues that the CEO 
salary should consist of a fixed part and a performance-based part. For the CEO, a high degree 
of performance-based compensation means that he must bear more risk and exert more effort in 
his job. For the shareholders, this is less risky as the manager will be forced to prioritize their 
interests in order to be compensated. In order to reduce risk, the CEO will use his managerial 
power to influence the structure of his compensation by making it less sensitive to performance 
and increase the fixed part of the salary (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004, p. 63). The core of the 
managerial power perspective is that the CEO has the power to influence his own compensation 
and thus receive a value that exceeds what they would get at arms-length bargaining. This excess 
value is by Bebchuk and Fried (2004, p. 62) called “rent.” Every manager will be able to secure 
some rent, but the degree of power the manager possess determines how much the rent will 
exceed market value. 
 
The relationship between the CEO and the board is symbiotic if the manager can punish the 
board members or have personal relationships with them. There are several reasons why board 
members would favor the CEO’s interest over the shareholders’ interests (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2004, p. 31). First, they have the incentive to retain their job. A seat at the table could mean 
status and high salaries, making it natural that the directors want to secure their positions at the 
table. Additionally, Schneider (2013, p. 19) argues that the top executives have much influence 
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in the nomination process of the board members. Thus, displeasing the CEO by going against 
his or her proposals increases the probability of not getting re-nominated. This could affect the 
reputation of the independent directors if the word spread about them being reluctant to go along 
with the CEO, reducing their chances of being appointed as a board member in other companies 
as well. As an owner, the CEO typically possesses a higher degree of power over the board. A 
shareholder inherits voting rights at the general assembly. If the owner holds the majority 
position, he or she can choose the board members without support from the other shareholders.  
Besides, one could also assume that an owner CEO holds more influence over potential external 
owners compared to a non-owner, increasing the managerial power. 
 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) propose some limits to the level of CEO compensation following the 
managerial power perspective. Firstly, market forces will control the compensation to some 
extent. Moreover, they present the term “outrageous costs,” which is when the compensation 
reaches a level that is perceived as outrageous by the public eye. This might lead to shareholder 
pressure and reduce the willingness of the board members to approve the compensation 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004, p. 66-67). 
 
The managerial power perspective is fascinating in terms of studying the pay sensitivity of the 
managerial compensation. We seek to determine if the compensation received by an owner CEO 
is less sensitive to firm performance than the compensation received by a non-owner CEO. 
From the managerial power perspective, we assume that owner CEOs inherit more power over 
their pay-setting process and use this power to reduce the pay-sensitivity of their compensation. 
3.3 Corporate governance  
Corporate governance affects both agency problems and managerial power. There are several 
models that aims to explain what is considered good corporate governance and different models 
have different areas of focus. Three common models are the Anglo-Saxon model, the Japanese 
model and the conventional-European model (Ungureanu, 2012). Norway have an own code of 
practice issued by The Norwegian Corporate Governance Board (2018). The aim of this code 
of practice is that listed firms will practice good corporate governance more thoroughly than 
they would do by just following legislations. The division of roles between executives, 
shareholders and the board of directors is the main focus. Our research question is closely linked 
to these roles. However, unlisted companies are not required to explain their governance, and 
this is likely affecting their governance practices. Since the corporate governance and other 
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factors in unlisted companies may be very different, it will be interesting to see if we find 
different results for these companies than previous research on listed companies.  
 
In shipping, a lot of companies do not separate the role of CEO and chairman, which many 
argue is an example of weak corporate governance. Krigslund (2018) writes that shipping 
companies have avoided criticism regarding weak governance in the past, despite the increased 
focus in the area elsewhere. Tsatsaronis and Syriopoulos (2011, pp. 4-5) discuss two schools of 
thought that address CEOs also serving as the chairman. The first view supports agency theory, 
and the argument is that a combined CEO and chairman creates a conflict of interest that would 
not be beneficial for other shareholders. The main concern is that there is no monitoring of CEO 
performance. In the context of our research question, this type of duality may indicate that CEOs 
have more power in deciding own compensation schemes. Consequently, duality may lead to 
higher compensation of the CEO. A different view derives from the advocates of stewardship 
theory. They believe that a combined CEO and chairman is more capable of acting efficiently 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991, p. 51). The concern of this view is that non-duality leads to slow 
and inefficient decision-making leading to poorer firm performance (Tsatsaronis & 
Syriopoulos, 2011, p. 5).  
3.4 The market for CEOs 
To this point, we have focused on specific theories related to the separation of ownership and 
control. In standard economic frameworks, the market forces are described as the most 
important determinant of prices. Prices are set in the intersection of supply and demand. The 
prices are what the market is willing to pay, given the supply of goods. Similarly, CEO pay is 
the price that the owners are willing to pay the CEO in order to perform at the desired level, 
given the supply of managerial talent. The owners should then provide sufficient incentives for 
the CEO to maximize firm value. Advocates of market forces believe that the rise in executive 
compensation is due to an increase in demand for managerial skills.  
 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004, pp. 53-58) discuss the impact of market forces on CEO pay. They 
agree that market forces indeed place constraints on CEO compensation, but they emphasize 
that these forces are not nearly tight enough to keep the executive compensation efficient. In 
theory, good performance by employees may lead to a promotion, and poor performance may 
result in the employee getting fired. CEOs differ from ordinary employees as promotion within 
the firm is impossible. However, there should be no constraints on CEOs being hired by a 
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different and larger firm. A problem with the standard market theory is that the majority of CEO 
positions are filled within the firm. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) conclude that the market forces 
are not strong enough to correct for non-market factors and that these are the most important in 
determining CEO compensation.  
 
Other studies find evidence that market forces are the most essential in explaining executive 
compensation. Nickerson (2017) studies the effect of an increase in demand for managers with 
a specific set of skills necessary to run a public company. He finds that a demand shock is 
leading to an average increase of 7 % in pay (Nickerson, 2017, p. 2306). Kaplan (2008, p. 8) 
addresses that while CEO compensation has been criticized, the pay of other types of managers 
has increased just as much. He argues that market forces, as well as arm’s-length bargaining, 
have prompted an increase in compensation for others than top executives as well. Because of 
that, he claims that it is difficult to explain the rise in CEO pay by non-market forces and “cozy 
board managements” (Kaplan, 2008, p. 8).  
3.5 Former research on CEO ownership and compensation 
There are several studies on CEO ownership and compensation, but listed firms are the most 
researched. Because of this, we think it’s interesting to examine the relationship of CEO 
ownership and pay in unlisted companies. These companies often have more concentrated 
governance structures, and fewer and larger owners. CEO duality is also more common in these 
companies. We will now present former research on the subject and their findings.  
Cohen and Lauterbach (2007) look at differences in pay between owner and non-owner CEOs 
in Israeli listed companies. They find that owner CEOs receive 50 % higher pay than non-owner 
CEOs. They use managerial power to describe the significantly higher pay by owner CEOs. 
Their findings do not coincide with agency theory. Chourou (2010) finds similar evidence by 
looking at Canadian family-owned businesses, but they find that it only applies to poorly 
governed companies. Amdouni & Boubaker (2015) studies French listed companies and finds 
similar evidence. Their study shows that the compensation of chief executive officers increases 
with their power and control and that owners earn more than non-owners. Again, the managerial 
power perspective supports these findings.   
 
 
Cyert, Kang & Kumar (2002) derives an analytical model of CEO compensation linked to 
variables on ownership and corporate governance, and further tests it empirically. They find 
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that CEO’s stock ownership is positively correlated with both base salary and equity-based 
compensation. Both relationships are significant at a five percent level. Although the analytical 
model indicates an ambiguous effect, the empirical results of Cyert et al. indicates a positive 
relationship. This contradicts our first hypotheses. Of control variables, CEO duality, the 
proportion of outside shareholders, CEO tenure, and firm risk are positively correlated and 
significant at a five percent level for base salary. For equity-based compensation, CEO duality 
is positively significant at a five percent level. CEO tenure and age are for equity-based 
compensation negative and significant together with board size (Cyert et al., 2002).  
 
Oxelheim & Randøy (2008) examine the same relationship in listed Norwegian and Swedish 
companies between 2002 and 2006. Unlike the research mentioned above, their study shows 
that non-owner CEOs receive higher compensations than the owners. These results fit with the 
predictions from agency theory. Oxelheim & Randøy (2008, p. 197) also find that other 
corporate governance variables such as board size, CEO age, chair tenure, the average age of 
board members, and geographical diversity of board members affect CEO pay. Randøy and 
Nielsen (2002, p. 74) also find a negative relationship between ownership and CEO pay looking 
at listed companies in Sweden and Norway. They argue that these results indicate that 
ownership could work as a substitute for monitoring in order to keep the firms’ wage level 
down. 
 
Interestingly, there is evidence in former research supporting both the predictions from the 
managerial power perspective and agency theory. The top executive’s power due to ownership 
and the size of other shareholders seems important in explaining compensation in the listed 
firms. These findings are pretty consistent in the research on listed firms internationally, but not 
on Scandinavian companies. It is fascinating to see that there is no evidence of the potential 
negative relationship between CEO ownership and their compensation in international studies. 
The different results might also be due to cultural or political disparities. For example, Cohen 
& Lauterbach (2007) emphasizes explicitly that corporate governance in Israeli firms the 
relevant period was generally weak. Besides, distinct social norms in Norway may put 
constraints on managerial power. 
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4. Data collecting 
We now describe the process of collecting data on unlisted companies in the Norwegian 
shipping and sea transport industry. First, we will explain how the industry is defined in our 
thesis (Section 4.1), before we describe the data collection and transformation process (Section 
4.2-4.5). In addition to gathering data, we have created some variables based on the data we 
collected, and we will present our variables in Section 4.6.  
4.1 Defining the shipping industry 
We collected data from proff.no and regnskapstall.no, websites that distribute financial 
statements from every company in Norway. Our definition of the shipping industry is based on 
the industry segmentation by Proff and Regnskapstall. The industry is called “Shipping and sea 
transport”. By choosing this segmentation, we get every company in Norway that supposedly 
operates in the shipping industry.  
 
However, there are some differences in how the two websites define the shipping industry. We 
observed that Regnskapstall included some companies categorized as a “transport” or “main 
office services” by Proff. On the one hand, this difference in segmentation may be an issue 
because the two different websites have their own opinion about what companies are considered 
shipping companies. On the other hand, some of the shipping companies from regnskapstall.no 
may fill out the gap of companies that operates in the shipping industry while not being labeled 
as a shipping company by proff.no. We decided to merge data from both websites and 
consequently, we obtained a more comprehensive dataset.  
4.2 Collecting data on CEO compensation 
The process of collecting data started with using a comparison tool at proff.no. This tool makes 
it possible to compare financial statements, and other variables, of up to ten companies at the 
time. These comparisons can be downloaded as Excel-sheets. After downloading the sheets for 
every company, a comprehensive cleaning and transformation process began. Every table 
needed to be transposed, cleaned, and structured. In addition to using the comparison tool, we 
collected a dataset with all companies in “Sea transport and shipping” from regnskapstall.no. 
The data from the two sources were merged into one dataset.  
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The biggest issue with the dataset was that it only contained CEO pay from 2018. The 
comparison tables from proff.no typically show historical data on most variables except CEO 
pay. Therefore, we needed to fill out the CEO salary for the years 2016 and 2017 manually. In 
addition to ordinary CEO salary, the financial statements contain “CEO other remuneration.” 
This number includes other forms of compensation not covered by the ordinary salary. This 
number may contain, but is not limited to, flights, hotels, car allowance, and more. Since this 
number did not show up in the comparison tables from proff.no, nor in the data we gathered 
from regnskapstall.no, we needed to fill out this as well. In the end, we added the salary and 
other remuneration together in order to get the total CEO pay each year. Finally, we created a 
variable of the growth rate of total CEO compensation from one year to another. This variable 
is calculated in the following way:  
	𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	𝑖𝑛	𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝑝𝑎𝑦B 	= 	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝑝𝑎𝑦B − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝑝𝑎𝑦BGH𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝑝𝑎𝑦BGH  
 
Some companies reported a salary of zero or blank, which potentially could be an issue. 
Questions that arise are whether there is a difference in reporting zero or blank and why we 
observe so many of these. Certain companies have blank fields in some years and zero other 
years, while other companies have merely zeros or blanks. This is likely because the CEO is 
paid through a different company, for example, another company in the same group. This may 
cause a problem with biasedness if these companies all share common characteristics. A lot of 
the companies with blank or zero CEO pay started in 2018. These observations are less relevant 
because of the lack of historical data.  
 
We can speculate that zero and blank values occur because of different practices in reporting. 
Nevertheless, reporting errors or that firms forget to report CEO pay seems questionable just 
because of how common it is. Zero or blank values might also be an indication that some CEOs 
only receive dividends and not salary. Nevertheless, we also observe that dividends are zero in 
many of the relevant cases. Assuming that CEOs get paid for doing their job, we decided to 
remove all zero values as they would have a significant impact on our analysis. We further 
discovered that in rare cases, CEO compensation was only listed at one of the websites. This 
may be due to differences in the algorithms that collect the data. Consequently, using two 
sources of information improves our dataset.  
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4.2.1 Different forms of CEO pay 
There are several ways to compensate CEOs. Some of them are very visible, but others are 
relatively “camouflaged.” By this, we mean that some forms of compensation are not clearly 
stated in the financial statements. There are several reasons why a firm would want to 
camouflage some parts of the compensation. The obvious one is that one can avoid some 
controversies of high executive pay (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004, pp. 5-6).  
 
The most intuitive form of payment is cash compensation, for example CEO salary and bonuses. 
These numbers are specified in the CEO’s contract and reported in the companies’ financial 
statements. Consequently, it is fairly easy to collect data on cash compensation.  However, there 
is no easy way to distinguish fixed and variable pay just by looking at the numbers. This makes 
it challenging to make inferences about the composition of CEO pay. To our knowledge, every 
dollar or Norwegian krone received by the CEO is reported in the company’s financial 
statements, thus making it easier to make inference about the total compensation received.   
 
Another form of compensation is issuing stock options. Bebchuk and Fried (2004, p. 7) strongly 
argue that CEO contracts should include other sorts of payments, like stock options. The main 
issue with stock options based on performance is to adjust for industry and market trends that 
affect the stock price. A company with a poor performing CEO may perform well financially 
due to general trends in the economy or the particular industry.  
 
In addition to ordinary salary, bonuses, and stock options, there are other opaque ways to 
compensate top executives. Firms might fear negative reactions to their CEO payments and 
consequently, a loss of reputation. This could lead to more creative ways to construct 
compensation schemes in order to camouflage parts of the total pay. Kuepper (n.d.) presents 
various forms of executive compensation, including retirement packages and other executive 
perks. Retirement packages are received after the CEO retires and may be a problem if they are 
detached from actual performance. Other executive perks may include the use of a jet, travel 
reimbursements, and other kinds of rewards Kuepper (n.d.). 
 
A limitation of collecting data from financial statements is that we cannot observe the 
composition of CEO pay. The total amount of pay is visible, but we do not know how much of 
the compensation is performance-based. By not knowing the pay composition, it is especially 
challenging to make inferences regarding pay-performance sensitivity. Therefore, we have 
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performed a survey to get a clearer picture of how the pay dynamics of top executives are. We 
will present the results of this survey in Section 6.  
4.3 Data on firm performance 
The financial statements contain all sorts of information like costs, salary expenses, revenues, 
and more. Other key figures, both recent and historically, are listed in separate sheets inside the 
Excel workbooks downloaded from proff.no. We ran queries on these sheets to merge historical 
data on all companies to one table. The job of adding these variables to the dataset was done by 
matching the legal company name. After completing this step, we had a solid sample of CEO 
compensation and financial key numbers dating back to 2014 for some variables. Some 
companies recently started operating. The variables are blank until the first year of operation.  
 
The merging of data acquired from proff.no and the dataset from regnskapstall.no resulted in a 
decent dataset, but it may not be complete. The total amount of shipping companies in Norway 
is approximately 2000, according to the websites. However, many of these firms seem to be 
newly started or not operating anymore. The total amount of firms in our dataset is 413. The 
two main reasons for this number being low is that many of the companies do not report CEO 
pay, or that they recently started operating. 
 
The variables from the financial statements include liquidity ratio and return on assets. These 
key numbers are both measures of firm performance. Proff.no calculates the variables the 
following way:  
	
Liquidity ratio = IJB5K	LMNNOPB	5QQOBQIJB5K	LMNNOPB	ROSB  
 
 
Return on assets = (TNJU)BQV	W	U)P5PL)5K	OX4OPQOQV)∗HZZ(IJB5K	5QQOBQV	W	BJB5K	5QQOBQV[\)∗\]  
 
In addition to liquidity ratio and return on assets, we also believe that growth in EBIT could be 
a good performance measure. Hence, we calculated a growth/change variable using the 
following formula: 
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ	𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇B = 	𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇B − 	𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇BGH𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇BGH  
 
Note: we tweaked the formula to show correct negative growth in cases where the EBIT goes from a negative number to an even lower 
number (e.g., from -200 to -300). Using the formula directly would in such cases give positive growth rates, which is wrong.   
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Some of the firms in our dataset had numbers from consolidated financial statements (a group 
of companies), because Proff uses these numbers in such cases. Companies that are part of a 
larger group of companies may have incredibly large aggregated earnings and assets. This is an 
issue if the CEO is only responsible for one company, and other CEOs manage the other 
companies in the group. In these cases, performance of the firm in question is inflated. In other 
situations, the CEO is also in charge of other companies in the group. When this is the case, the 
numbers may not be misleading.  
 
First, we decided to change the numbers for the companies where the CEO is only responsible 
for one company. Furthermore, we kept the numbers from the companies where the CEO was 
in charge of all the other companies in the group. To our knowledge, this is the best way to 
correct for some of the most misleading numbers. However, an issue arises when determining 
ownership structures of the firms of which we use consolidated statements. It is difficult to pin 
down the correct ownership percentage when the ownership and board composition is different 
across the firms in one group. This problem applied to 27 firms. Thus, we did our analysis with 
and without the relevant firms. However, the size and the p-values of the coefficients did not 
change significantly, and we decided to include them in our analysis. 
4.4 Currencies in the financial statements 
The majority of the data collected was reported in Norwegian Kroner (NOK). However, some 
of the firms reported in American Dollars (USD), Danske Kroner (DKK), and Euro (EUR). For 
example, some companies had their financial statements published in NOK some years and 
USD in other years. Different currencies are a problem when dealing with absolute numbers, as 
they are not comparable. Relative changes may still be comparable, but the data should be on 
the same scale. Therefore, we gathered information about the average exchange rates in the 
corresponding years to convert all numbers to NOK. 
 
The central bank of Norway has several datasets of historical exchange rate data available for 
downloading (Norges Bank, n.d.). Converting the numbers to NOK is not a problem, but there 
might be some imprecisions because they are converted with a yearly exchange rate. For 
example, the American dollar fluctuated between 7.77 and 8.60 in 2018 alone. If some 
companies have a lot of income and costs presented in different currencies, the time of 
conversion and the exchange rate will affect the numbers. In total, this was relevant for 35 of 
the firms in our dataset. We did not want to remove more data, so we considered the data being 
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on the same scale to be more important than worrying about small imperfections in the 
converted numbers.  
4.5 Variables on the CEO and ownership structure 
Finding variables on the CEO and ownership structure required some more profound research 
than just collecting numbers from tables. We had to dig deeper into the ownership structures 
and CEO characteristics manually. Variables on the age and gender of the CEO may be relevant 
in explaining differences in pay and we consequently collected this information. The difference 
between male and female wages is a known issue. Therefore, we believe it is interesting to 
control for CEO gender. We present this as a dummy variable that is “1” if female and “0” if 
male. Additionally, we want to examine whether the gender balance of the board can explain 
CEO pay. Therefore, we added a variable of female representation on the BOD. 50 % represents 
a perfectly gender-balanced BOD, 0 % represents a BOD with all men, and 100 % all women. 
We also added a dummy variable for the gender of the chairperson. The total number of people 
on the board was collected as well.  
 
The number and size of shareholders may affect executive compensation. First, we created a 
dummy that captures CEO ownership. The variable is “1” if he or she is a non-owner, and “0” 
otherwise. A person may also be an indirect owner, which means having ownership through 
another company he or she owns. Therefore, indirect owners were marked as owners. The actual 
ownership percentage of the CEO may be important, so we collected the ownership percentages 
of all the CEOs in our dataset. One observation is that many of the CEOs also serve as the leader 
of the board. We discussed in Section 3.3 that CEO duality is quite common in shipping 
companies. Hence, we added a variable for CEO duality that is “1” if the CEO is also the 
chairman, “0” otherwise.  
 
One thing worth noting about the CEO payments in our dataset is that a CEO does not always 
receive them. Unlisted companies are not required to have a CEO in Norway and may instead 
appoint a “contact person” or have the chairman in charge of daily operations. In such cases, it 
is not always clear who receives the payments. This has implications for how we collect and 
interpret our data, both in terms of CEO characteristics and pay. To our best knowledge, the 
“contact person” does not receive the payments if he or she is not the chairman as well. Some 
of the contact persons in our dataset were listed as a contact person in several companies and 
would thus receive substantial payments from multiple firms. The head of the board looks more 
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likely to be the recipient of these payments, as that person often varies even though the contact 
person is the same. According to Altinn (n.d.b), the head of the board does perform CEO duties 
in cases where the firm does not have one. Therefore, we conclude that the head of the board is 
the recipient of executive pay in cases where the chairman and the contact person is not the 
same. Consequently, we treat the chairmen as a CEO when relevant. The companies 
with different chairman and contact persons were removed, as we cannot be sure who of them 
receives the CEO pay. The number of firms removed because of this issue was 25.  
4.6 Dependent and independent variables 
Table 2 presents our dependent variables. In addition to level CEO pay, we use the change in 
pay to analyze the sensitivity related to performance. Not that CEO pay is the logarithm of total 





Table 2 – Description of our dependent variables 
Variable Description 
CEO pay 18 (ln) Logarithm of total compensation paid out to the CEO in 2018 
CEO pay 17 (ln) Logarithm of total compensation paid out to the CEO in 2017 
Change CEO pay 2018 The percentage change in total CEO pay between 2017 and 2018 
Change CEO pay 2017 The percentage change in total CEO pay between 2016 and 2017 
 
 
Table 3 shows and describes our independent variables. Scatterplots (see Appendix A2) of assets 
and CEO pay showed limited spread. Taking the natural logarithm of both variables spread out 
the data points and therefore, we will use log-transformed CEO pay and assets only. It is worth 
noting that we have multiple interaction variables (the bottom eight variables in Table 3) to 
examine differences in pay-performance sensitivity between owners and non-owners. These are 
the dummy variable “Non-owner” multiplied with different measures of performance, growth 
in EBIT, ROA, and Liquidity. 
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Table 3 – Description of our independent variables 
Variable Description 
Assets 17 (ln) The logarithm of total assets 2017, used as a proxy for firm size 
Assets 16 (ln) The logarithm of total assets 2016, used as a proxy for firm size 
Board Size Number of people on the BOD 
CEO Age Age of CEO (2019 – year born) 
Ownership CEO The direct ownership fraction of the CEO 
CEO Duality 1 if the CEO also is the chairperson, 0 if not 
Growth EBIT 17 Growth in EBIT from 2016-2017, used as a proxy for firm performance 
Growth EBIT 16 Growth in EBIT from 2015-2016, used as a proxy for firm performance 
Growth EBIT 15 Growth in EBIT from 2014-2015, used as a proxy for firm performance 
Non-owner 1 if the CEO is not an owner, 0 if he is a direct or indirect owner 
Female CEO 1 if the CEO is female, 0 if not 
Female Chairman 1 if the chairman is female, 0 if not 
Females on the board The fraction of females represented on the board, measured in per cent 
ROA 17 Return on assets in 2017, used as a proxy for firm performance 
ROA 16 Return on assets in 2016, used as a proxy for firm performance 
ROA 15 Return on assets in 2015, used as a proxy for firm performance 
Liquidity 17 Liquidity ratio in 2017, used as a proxy for firm performance 
Liquidity 16 Liquidity ratio in 2016, used as a proxy for firm performance 
Liquidity 15 Liquidity ratio in 2015, used as a proxy for firm performance 
N.O. growth EBIT 17 Non-owner * Growth EBIT 17 
N.O. growth EBIT 16 Non-owner * Growth EBIT 16 
N.O. growth EBIT 15 Non-owner * Growth EBIT 15 
N.O. ROA 17 Non-owner * ROA 17 
N.O. ROA 16 Non-owner * ROA 16 
N.O. ROA 15 Non-owner * ROA 15 
N.O. Liquidity 17 Non-owner * Liquidity 17 
N.O. Liquidity 16 Non-owner * Liquidity 16 
N.O. Liquidity 15 Non-owner * Liquidity 15 
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4.6.1 Other variables collected or created 
In addition to the variables presented in the former sub-sections, we have also collected the 
variables listed in Table 4. For different reasons, they are not included in the analysis.  
 
Table 4 – Other variables in our dataset 
Variable Description 
CEO pay total 16 Total compensation paid out to the CEO in 2016 (salary + other 
remuneration) 
CEO pay total 15 Total compensation paid out to the CEO in 2015 (salary + other 
remuneration) 
Change in CEO salary 18 The percentage change in CEO salary between 2017 and 2018 
Change in CEO salary 17 The percentage change in CEO salary between 20176 and 2017 
CEO salary 18 CEO salary in 2018 
CEO salary 17 CEO salary in 2017 
CEO salary 16 CEO salary in 2016 
CEO salary 15 CEO salary in 2015 
CEO pay other 18 CEO other remuneration in 2018 
CEO pay other 17 CEO other remuneration in 2017 
CEO pay other 16 CEO other remuneration in 2016 
CEO pay other 15 CEO other remuneration in 2015 
Net income 18 Total net income of 2018 
Net income 17 Total net income of 2017 
Net income 16 Total net income of 2016 
Net income 15 Total net income of 2015 
Growth net income 18 Growth in net income from 2017 to 2018 
Growth net income 17 Growth in net income from 2016 to 2017 
Growth net income 16 Growth in net income from 2015 to 2016 
Growth net income 15 Growth in net income from 2014 to 2015 
N.O. growth net income 17 Non-owner * Growth net income 18 
N.O. growth net income 16 Non-owner * Growth net income 17 
N.O. growth net income 15 Non-owner * Growth net income 16 
ROA 18 Return on assets in 2018 
Liquidity 18 The liquidity ratio of 2018 
EBIT 18 EBIT in 2018 (level) 
EBIT 17 EBIT in 2017 (level) 
EBIT 16 EBIT in 2016 (level) 
EBIT 15 EBIT in 2015 (level) 
Growth EBIT 18 Growth in EBIT from 2017 to 2018 
Assets 16 Total assets in 2016 
Assets 15 Total assets in 2015 
Growth assets 18 Growth in total assets from 2017 to 2018 
Growth assets 17 Growth in total assets from 2016 to 2017 
Growth assets 16 Growth in total assets from 2015 to 2016 
CEO gender String-variable. F: female, M: male 
CEO year born The year the CEO in question was born 
CEO direct owner 1 if the CEO is a direct owner, 0 if not.  
CEO indirect owner 1 if the CEO is an indirect owner, 0 if not. 
Owner 1 if the CEO is a direct or indirect owner, 0 if not an owner 
Sole owner 1 if the CEO is a sole owner of the company, 0 if not 
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5. Research method 
This research aims to examine if there is a relationship between ownership and executive 
compensation. More specifically, we will study the difference in pay received by an owner-
CEO and a non-owner CEO. Moreover, we make an estimation of the agency cost related to 
hiring an external top executive. Lastly, we will study differences in pay-performance 
sensitivity between the groups. 
 
The purpose of the following chapter is to present the methodology used to test our hypotheses. 
We will start by introducing the structure of our data (Section 5.1), before we present the OLS 
method used in our research (Section 5.2) and the purpose of using dummy variables (Section 
5.3). In the end, we will be present and explain our models (Section 5.4).  
5.1  Cross-sectional data 
When performing an empirical analysis, there are generally three ways of structuring the data, 
cross-sectional data, time-series data, or panel data (Wooldridge, 2013). In order to estimate the 
relationship between ownership and CEO compensation, we have collected a sample of cross-
sectional data with lagged explanatory variables. One could argue that the dataset is panel data 
since we have collected data over several years. However, we will not be conducting a panel 
data analysis, and therefore we treat our data as cross-sectional. Additionally, some firms in our 
dataset do not have historical data due to the time they started operating. To test the pay 
sensitivity, we use change variables constructed by the lagged explanatory variables. With 
lagged variables, we can research if performance in previous years impacts the change in 
compensation in the following years. 
 
Cross-sectional data consists of a sample of members in the population in question at a given 
point in time (Wooldridge, 2013, pp. 5-6). Time is not of the essence, and the data might not be 
collected from the same exact time. However, since we are using reported data from the 
companies’ financial statements, the data will represent the same time frame. 
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5.2  Ordinary least squares regressions 
To estimate CEO pay and pay sensitivity, we use ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. We 
perform our analysis using the statistics software STATA. OLS regressions minimize the sum 
of squared residuals between the observations in the dataset and an estimated linear function. It 
is used to estimate the intercept and slope parameters of the population in question (Wooldridge, 
2013, p. 30). A simple linear regression can be expressed like this:  
 𝑦b = 	𝛽dZ + 𝛽dH𝑥H + 𝑢 
 
The equation above is a simple model for explaining 𝑦b in terms of x. However, this model 
assumes that all other factors that have an impact on 𝑦b is uncorrelated with x, which is a 
somewhat unrealistic assumption (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 24). Therefore, the estimation of CEO-
compensation will be based on a multiple linear regression model which can be written as:  
 𝑦b 	= 		 𝛽dZ + 𝛽dH𝑥H + 𝛽d3	𝑥3 + 𝛽dg	𝑥g	+. . . +𝛽di𝑥i + 𝑢	
	
This method allows us to control for multiple factors at the same time, which all simultaneously 
affect the dependent variable. 𝛽dZ	represent the intercept, while 𝛽dH,	𝛽d3,	𝛽dg and 𝛽di represents the 
estimated change in 𝑦b	with respect to their corresponding independent variables 𝑥i. The 
variable 𝑢 represents the error term and include all the variables that is excluded from the model 
(Wooldridge, 2013, p. 23). 
5.3 Dummy variable 
We have already addressed our dummy variables in Section 4. A dummy variable is an indicator 
variable that is used to describe qualitative information with two or more distinct categories in 
the model. The dummy variables are typically limited to two values; “1” and “0”. When the 
dummy variable is true, the dummy takes the value “1”. Opposite, when the dummy is false, it 
takes the value of “0”. One has to assign the value “1” and “0” to the different events in advance. 
The easiest way to do this is to name the dummy after the event with value “1” (Wooldridge, 
2013, p. 228).  
 
The important dummy variable in our analysis is “Non-owner”, which takes the value of “1” is 
the CEO is a non-owner and 0 if the CEO is an owner. Other dummy variables are “CEO 
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duality”, “Female CEO”, and “Female chairman”. All of the dummies are named after the events 
they represent and take the value of “1” if the event is true. 
5.4 Our models 
In Section 3.5, we introduced previous research (Amdouni & Boubaker, 2015; Cohen & 
Lautherbach, 2007; Chourou, 2010; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2008; Randøy & Nielsen, 2002) on 
the topic of CEO-pay. This thesis differs from these studies by looking at unlisted firms rather 
than listed. As mentioned in Section 1, we cannot know whether the research on listed firms 
applies to unlisted firms. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is also to reduce the research gap 
between listed and unlisted firms. As a result of this, we find it relevant to organize our data 
mainly the same way as the previous studies to make our study somewhat comparable. 
However, it is an issue that we do not have access to all the same measures as former research 
have on listed firms. 
 
In order to estimate the effect of ownership on CEO compensation, we have chosen to use CEO 
pay as the dependent variable. The natural logarithm of CEO compensation is used, which is a 
usual approach when dealing with monetary measures. The model is written as:  
 (1)				 ln 𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝑝𝑎𝑦B = 𝛽Z + 𝛽H ∗ ln𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠B + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽g ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝐴𝑔𝑒 	+	𝛽q ∗	Non-owner					+	𝛽x ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +	𝛽{ ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒	𝐶𝐸𝑂 +	𝛽~ ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒	𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛				+	𝛽 ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠	𝑜𝑛	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑			
This model aims to answer our first hypothesis, if a non-owner CEO receives more 
compensation than an owner CEO. In addition, we use Assets as a proxy for firm size as well as 
controlling for CEO and firm characteristics that we believe could impact the compensation.  
 
We expect that there is a negative relationship between ownership and pay and that the effect is 
increasing with ownership percentage. To study this relationship, we include the ownership 
percentage of the owner CEOs. This provides us with the following model: 
 (2)			ln 𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝑝𝑎𝑦B = 𝛽Z + 𝛽H ∗ ln𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠B + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽g ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝐴𝑔𝑒 	+	𝛽q ∗	CEO Ownership	%		+	𝛽x ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +	𝛽{ ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒	𝐶𝐸𝑂 +	𝛽~ ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒	𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛								+	𝛽 ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠	𝑜𝑛	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑		
 
  33 
Moving on, we will test Hypothesis 2 about pay sensitivity. In order to capture the pay 
sensitivity, the dependent variable is now the change in compensation from year t-1 to t. We 
present three different models for the years 2018 and 2017. Each model uses different measures 
of performance; growth in EBIT, ROA, and liquidity. The models are written as: 






In Section 6.1, we will discuss descriptive statistics of our dependent and independent variables. 
Next, we test our hypotheses (Section 6.2) and discuss our findings. After presenting the models, 
we will test them according to the Gauss-Markov assumptions (Appendix A3) in Section 6.3. 
The last section (Section 6.4) will present the findings of the survey sent out to the CEOs in our 
dataset.  
6.1 Descriptive statistics  
6.1.1 The dependent variables 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics of the dependent variables. We have included the count 
of the variables, mean, standard deviation, minimum values, maximum values, 25th percentile, 
median (50th percentile) and the 75th percentile. Note that we have included the level of CEO 
pay from 2017 and 2018 in the summary statistics, even though they do not appear in our 
analysis. The reason is that compensation in level form is easier to interpret. 
 
     Table 5 – Summary statistics of the dependent variables  
     N   Mean   St.Dev   min   max   p25  Median   p75 
1 CEO pay 18 354 1565.094 2621.903 2 32901 400 902.5 1849 
1 CEO pay 17 333 1384.57 1813.258 4 17525 472 836 1776 
2 CEO pay 18 (ln) 354 6.579 1.49 .693 10.401 5.991 6.805 7.522 
2 CEO pay 17 (ln) 333 6.602 1.276 1.386 9.771 6.118 6.718 7.451 
  Change CEO pay 18 290 .044 .404 -.993 3.385 -.044 .013 .129 
  Change CEO pay 17 277 .088 .562 -.944 4.512 -.049 .015 .107 
1 Numbers in 1000 NOK 
2 Log of numbers in 1000 NOK 
 
We see that there is quite a difference between the mean and the median for these variables. By 
looking at the percentiles and maximum values, we understand that outliers are present. A 
maximum of 32.9 MNOK is a large observation compared to the majority of our dataset. It is 
also worth noting that the minimum observations of pay, 2 000 and 4 000 NOK, are very low. 
This indicates that some CEOs have the majority of their pay listed elsewhere, or that the firm 
was established at the end of the year. Also, the observed compensation might be low for small 
companies or if the CEO works part-time. We see that the 25th percentile in 2018 is 400.000 
NOK.  
 
There is no general minimum wage in Norway. However, some industries have minimum 
hourly wages, usually at approximately 200 NOK per hour (Arbeidstilsynet, n.d.). This 
minimum wage equals 350.000 NOK a year, given a total of 1750 working hours. Looking at 
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our dataset, we see that many of the firms with CEO pay below 350.000 NOK are of small size. 
However, some of the firms are large. A large firm paying its top executive this low is highly 
unlikely. Therefore, we wanted to remove some of our lowest observations of pay. Setting a 
limit is challenging. Given that some firms are small and that they might have a part-time CEO, 
we do not want to get rid of too many observations. When we gathered contact information for 
the CEOs in our dataset, we observe that some companies seemed to be operating only some 
months during the year. These companies tend to be small, which we correct for by using assets 
as a proxy for firm size. In the end, we decided to remove all observations below 200.000 NOK. 
This equals a 33.3 % job (e.g., four months of the year) that would have paid 600.000 NOK as 
a full-time employee. Setting higher limits of total pay does not impact the results in a significant 
way.  
 
Table 6 – Summary statistics of dependent variables, after removing low observations 
     N   Mean   St.Dev   min   max   p25   Median   p75 
1 CEO pay 18 308 1788.475 2742.019 200 32901.22 600.5 1025.5 2001.5 
1 CEO pay 17 299 1533.986 1855.62 200 17525.82 558 941.963 1854 
2 CEO pay 18 (ln) 308 7.017 .9 5.298 10.401 6.398 6.933 7.602 
2 CEO pay 17 (ln) 299 6.935 .852 5.298 9.771 6.324 6.848 7.525 
  Change CEO pay 18 259 .069 .299 -.852 1.734 -.014 .026 .133 
  Change CEO pay 17 247 .042 .285 -.944 1.983 -.037 .017 .103 
1 Numbers in 1000 NOK 
2 Log of numbers in 1000 NOK 
 
The reduced dataset is summarized in Table 6. In total, there are 308 and 299 observations of 
CEO pay in respectively 2018 and 2017, and the total amount of firms is 413. The difference in 
observations of “Change CEO pay”-variables and CEO pay occurs because some companies 




Figure 1 – Average total CEO pay of non-owners and owners in 2017 & 2018 
Figure 1 shows a significant difference in the average pay of owners and non-owners. The 












Average CEO pay 2017 Average CEO pay 2018
Average pay of Non-owners Average pay of owners
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2018. We also observe an increase in the average pay of both owners and non-owners between 
2017 and 2018. There is one very large observation of a non-owner CEO in 2018, which pushes 
the average higher. Without this observation, the average pay of non-owners in 2018 is closer 





Figure 2 – Average change in CEO pay of non-owners and owners 
Moving on to the change variables, we observe a change of 4.4 % in 2017 and 5.8 % in 2018 
for owners. In comparison, the average increase in Norwegian salaries from 2017 to 2018 was 
2.9 % (SSB, 2019). This was a 0.6 percentage points increase from the growth between 2016 
and 2017 (Bing, 2017). Looking at the same variables for non-owners, we see that the change 
variables for non-owners are very inconsistent between the years (Figure 2), which might be 
due to higher pay-performance sensitivity. OSLO Shipping Index (Oslo Børs, n.d) confirms that 
2016 was a particularly bad year for shipping, which can explain the low changes in 
compensation from 2016 to 2017. The same index also shows that 2017 was a significantly 
better year, and this fits with the substantially higher changes in pay from 2017 to 2018 (see 
Appendix A7 – Figure 20 for the index). Note that OSLO Shipping Index is based on listed 
shipping firms. Nevertheless, it seems fair to assume that the trends in this index apply to the 
whole shipping industry.  
6.1.2 The independent variables 
The table below (Table 7) presents summary statistics of our independent variables. We have 
included the number of observations, mean and standard deviation for the whole dataset, and 
















Change in CEO pay 2017 Change in CEO pay 2018
Average change in pay of non-owners Average change in pay of owners
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Table 7 – Summary statistics of our independent variables  
 
 Total                Owners Non-owners 
     N   Mean   St.Dev   N   Mean   St.Dev N Mean St.Dev 
 1Assets 18 (ln) 400 9.789 2.408 250 9.09 2.14 150 10.955 2.384 
 1Assets 17 (ln) 401 9.767 2.337 251 9.133 2.023 150 10.827 2.446 
 Board size 389 2.568 1.425 256 2.227 1.33 133 3.226 1.374 
 CEO Age 410 54.034 10.467 257 53.848 10.867 153 54.346 9.785 
 Non-owner 413 .378 .485 257 0 0 156 1   0 
 Ownership CEO 392 .37 .401 257 .565 .367 135 0 0 
 CEO Duality 410 .449 .498 257 .591 .493 153 .209 .408 
 Growth EBIT 17 382 .812 7.762 240 .56 7.258 142 1.238 8.556 
 Growth EBIT 16 370 .237 14.4 231 1.696 11.852 139 -2.187 17.631 
 Growth EBIT 15 292 1.966 35.149 186 2.054 23.445 106 1.813 49.552 
 ROA 17 403 7.188 29.723 252 8.596 26.17 151 4.838 34.826 
 ROA 16 388 7.474 29.922 242 10.79 29.848 146 1.978 29.329 
 ROA 15 373 10.851 29.738 232 11.995 27.984 141 8.968 32.434 
 Liquidity 17 398 25.843 406.896 248 4.655 28.58 150 60.874 661.66 
 Liquidity 16 386 16.292 239.964 241 3.976 9.549 145 36.763 391.31 
 Liquidity 15 371 18.328 277.539 231 4.07 
.051 
13.287 140 41.853 451.50 
 Female CEO 411 .068 .252 257 .22 154 .097 .297 
 Female Chairman 389 .062 .241 256 .055 .228 133 .075 .265 
 Females on the board 389 .107 .22 256 .096 .223 133 .128 .214 
1 Log of numbers in 1000 NOK   
  D = Dummy variable 
 
Firm size is one of the essential firm characteristics because we assume that larger firms have 
more sales, assets, and less probability of going bankrupt. We further assume that larger 
companies are able to pay their top executives more than smaller firms. Hence, we find it 
essential to control for firm size in order to avoid skewed results, and we use Assets for this 
purpose. Table 7 reveals that non-owners typically are in charge of larger firms, which is not 
surprising. We observe that ROA in 2017, 2016 and 2015 vary a lot looking at the standard 
deviations. Further investigation also shows that this is due to negative outliers from the same 
firm. Additionally, firms with non-owner CEOs show a much higher mean and standard 
deviation of liquidity, which indicate that there might be outliers present in this group. We 
discuss the removal of outliers in Section 6.3.5. 
 
The average ownership share is 37 %. This is higher than the median of 20 %, which indicates 
that a decent number of our CEOs have large ownership shares. The non-owner dummy variable 
tells us that 37.8 % of our observed companies have a non-owner CEO. Because of that, we 
have two relatively large groups to compare. One can also observe variations in the number of 
observations, N, of the different variables. The reasons are mainly that some companies did not 
operate in all years between 2015 and 2018, and blank values. EBIT growth shows high mean 
values and standard deviation, indicating large outliers (discussed in Section 6.3.5). Further 
investigation shows that the median of growth in EBIT from 2016 to 2017 is 5.3 %, while the 
growth from 2015 to 2016 is -6.9 %. This can explain the difference in the growth rate of CEO 
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compensation between the years for non-owners, given that their pay is more coupled to 
performance. OSLO Shipping Index also coincides with these observations.  
6.2 Regression analysis 
We will present our results from the OLS regressions in this section. The focus in subsection 
6.2.1 will be on identifying the difference in pay between owners and non-owners. The analysis 
is both on CEO pay from 2017 and 2018. Subsection 6.2.2 presents the estimated cost of having 
a non-owner CEO, and we will also study the effect of ownership percentage. Subsection 6.2.3 
aims to examine differences in pay-performance sensitivity. Three variables are used as a 
performance measure, growth in EBIT, return on assets (ROA), and the liquidity ratio. 
6.2.1 Difference in pay between non-owner and owner CEO 
The relationship between CEO compensation and ownership is presented in Table 8. We will 
discuss the relationship between the explanatory variables and CEO pay in 2018 and 2017. For 
the 2017 numbers, we have corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
 
Table 8 – CEO pay 2018 & 2017 
 (1) (2) 
 CEO pay 18 (ln) CEO pay 17 (ln) 
Assets 18 (ln) 0.154***  
 (6.35)  
Assets 17 (ln)  0.147*** 
  (6.64) 
CEO Duality -0.0610 -0.158 
 (-0.56) (-1.45) 
CEO Age 0.00185 0.00436 
 (0.43) (1.15) 
Non-owner 0.470*** 0.390*** 
 (4.59) (3.79) 
Board Size 0.0341 0.0585 
 (0.87) (1.51) 
Female CEO -0.664*** -0.306* 
 (-3.63) (-1.69) 
Female Chairman 0.315 0.440** 
 (1.30) (2.48) 
Female on the board -0.0511 -0.385* 
 (-0.20) (-1.84) 
Constant 5.152*** 5.042*** 
 (16.85) (18.34) 
N 298 291 
R2 0.3674 0.4151 
adj. R2 0.3521 0.4006 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Assets have a significant impact on CEO compensation at a one percent level. This finding is 
not surprising as we would expect larger firms with a higher cash flow being able to pay their 
top-executive more. Besides, there may be a higher degree of responsibility for the CEOs in 
larger companies, which indicates higher compensation. The coefficients suggest that a 
company with 100 % more assets than another company provides the CEO with 15.4 % higher 
compensation. With 2017 numbers, 100 % more assets lead to 14.7 % higher compensation.  
 
The coefficient for non-owners displays a positive relationship between not being an owner of 
the firm and compensation. The effect is significant at a one percent level. A non-owner CEO 
appears to earn as much as 47.0 % more on average than an owner CEO in 2018, all else equal. 
The difference is less in 2017 at 39.0 %. This is evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1. These results 
are consistent with agency theory, but they contradict the managerial power perspective. CEO 
duality correlates negatively with compensation in 2017 and 2018. However, the effect is 
insignificant in both years. Since the CEO in most cases with duality also is an owner of the 
firm, we would expect to see this relationship. There is evidence of a negative relationship 
between female CEO and CEO compensation, a result that is not surprising. The size of the 
coefficient, however, is larger than we had expected in advance.  
 
The coefficient for board size is not significant but shows a positive relationship for both years, 
indicating that larger boards are associated with higher compensation. The board size variable 
is likely correlated with firm size to some extent, as one could assume that larger firms have 
larger boards. Hence, some of the effects we expected to see in the board size coefficient may 
be captured by the variable for assets. The correlation matrices (Table 15 & 16 in the appendix) 
confirms a correlation, albeit not strong enough to cause multicollinearity problems. CEO age 
is not significant but shows a positive relationship. This indicates that older CEOs earn more. 
The sign of the coefficient was expected in advance. Higher age is often equivalent to more 
experience and higher abilities to run a firm, which in turn increases pay.  
 
The analysis suggests that the gender composition of the board impacts CEO compensation. 
Both Female chairman and Females on the board are significant in 2017. All else equal, the 
model suggests that a CEO in cases of female chairman receives as much as 44.0% more in 
compensation than CEOs with a male chairman. This effect is not significant in 2018, but the 
relationship remains positive. However, compensation is negatively correlated with females on 
the board in 2017. The interpretation is that the compensation decreases with 38.5 % if all the 
members on the board are female. This means that a higher gender balance on the board 
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decreases the executive pay as opposed to a board consisting only of men. Nevertheless, this 
effect is not significant in 2018. Even though the effect continues to be negative, the size of the 
coefficient drops substantially compared to 2017. Different years have different samples of 
firms. Some firms are included in both years, and others are not, which may be an explanation 
of the change in coefficient between the years.  
Result 1: Non-owner CEOs receive considerably higher compensation than 
owner CEOs.  
Discussing the findings  
Our findings in Table 8 matches the findings of Randøy & Nielsen (2002), and Oxelheim & 
Randøy (2008), which indicate that unlisted and listed firms in Norway share the same 
characteristics regarding executive compensation. However, the findings contradict the research 
of Cohen & Lauterbach (2007), Chourou (2010), and Amdouni & Boubaker (2015). This is 
interesting since Randøy & Nielsen (2002) and Oxelheim & Randøy (2008) also look at 
Scandinavian companies, while the other studies examine countries outside the Scandinavian 
borders. The findings observed in the Scandinavian countries are what we would expect to see 
according to the agency theory. Thus, there seems to be something else explaining executive 
pay in other countries. One explanation may be related to the managerial power perspective. 
Owners in other parts of the world might exert their managerial power to a higher degree than 
owners in Norway in order to demand a higher salary.  
 
The agency theory focuses on incentivizing external managers. Nevertheless, the contracts of 
the Norwegian non-owners may be inefficient due to asymmetric information. According to 
Bebchuk and Fried (2006, p. 19), performance-based pay is a good way to incentivize managers. 
However, this form of compensation must a have higher expected value than fixed pay in order 
to compensate for the additional risk. If the performance measures are easily manipulated or not 
controlled for exogenous shocks, this could mean that the top executive is overpaid. 
Additionally, shipping involves much industry-related knowledge, and it is conceivable that 
there is a degree of portability within the industry. Non-owners are likely more portable in terms 
of changing jobs, and companies may pay extra in order to retain their managers and the 
knowledge they possess. 
 
Another explanation might be the market for CEOs in the shipping industry. An owner CEO is 
not required to pay him or herself market price, but in order to recruit and retain managerial 
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talents, firms must comply with the market prices. Owners, on their side, have self-interests in 
the firm, and they might choose to keep the money inside the firm and take out dividends if it 
performs well. Dividends can also be used to camouflage the owners’ payments. Sometimes it 
might be questionable to compensate oneself highly compared to the employees, making 
dividends a preferable solution compared to high salaries. Our survey indicates that dividends 
are not commonly used to substitute salary, and that some CEOs restrain their compensation in 
order to keep the general wage level within the firm down.  
 
Randøy and Nielesen (2002) argue in their study that the Scandinavian egalitarian and social 
democratic culture has contributed to decouple firm performance from CEO pay. Cohen and 
Lautherback (2007) on their side state that weak corporate governance in Israel gives the owners 
much freedom in deciding their own compensation. Also, Amdouni and Boubaker (2015) 
highlight the weak legal system of France. Norway have strong social norms regarding not 
putting oneself above others. In general, this means that if an owner rewards himself with a 
much higher compensation than the average worker, he will provoke reactions. Thus, the social 
norms and focus on income equality in Norway might put some additional restrictions on the 
pay of top executives compared to other countries. Overall, our findings indicate that the 
managerial power perspective is inferior in explaining CEO compensation for Norwegian firms.  
6.2.2 The agency cost of having a non-owner CEO 
Section 1.2 argues that the difference in pay between owners and non-owners represents an 
agency cost. Evidence from the previous section (Table 8) suggests that there might be a 
relevant and significant agency cost regarding the compensation of top executives without 
ownership. Based on the 2018 numbers in Table 8, a company that goes from having an owner 
CEO to a non-owner CEO, must pay a non-owner CEO 47 % more compared to an owner CEO, 
keeping everything else fixed. Using the 95 % confidence interval, an all else equal equation 
for the CEO pay of a non-owner would be:  
 
(1) 𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝑝𝑎𝑦PJPGJPON = 𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝑝𝑎𝑦JPON ∗ (1.47 ± 0.20) 
 
A slightly more moderate estimate based on the 2017 confidence interval is: 
 
(2)  𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝑝𝑎𝑦PJPGJPON = 𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝑝𝑎𝑦JPON ∗ (1.39 ± 0,20) 
 
*Note that ±	0.20 in both equations does not mean that we assume that these numbers are identical, but the difference between them is so small that 
both numbers are rounded down to 0.20. 
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Whether or not this difference in pay is an incentive cost can be discussed. In Section 3.1.1, we 
presented theory on information asymmetries. If non-owners are better at hiding their flaws and 
less attractive traits, they can negotiate better contracts for themselves. All information that 
reveals the actual level of effort and skill of the manager may not be visible for the owners. If a 
significant fraction of CEO compensation is performance-based bonuses, the difference in pay 
between non-owners and owners might be explained as an incentive cost to align interests. If 
the compensation is mainly fixed, this could be an indication of more lucrative contracts because 
of hidden information or hidden actions. Higher base salary may also be intended as an 
incentive, even though studies show that these kinds of incentives are not efficient, see for 
example Bebchuk & Fried (2004). However, both explanations above represent agency costs. 
The question is whether this cost is apparent for incentive purposes or that the principals propose 
and accepts contracts that seem reasonable given the information they have. Our survey answers 
will provide deeper insights regarding pay composition. 
 
One disadvantage of using only the non-owner dummy to control for ownership, is that owners 
with small ownership percentages are placed in the same category as sole owners. Thus, the 
non-owner coefficient may be too low. To correct for this, we will now present some slightly 
altered models to investigate how the variation in ownership percentage affect CEO pay. The 
model using 2017 numbers is corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Table 9 – CEO pay 2018 & 2017 related to CEO ownership percentage 
 (1) (2) 
 CEO pay 18 (ln) CEO pay 17 (ln) 
Assets 18 (ln) 0.160***  
 (6.49)  
Assets17 (ln)  0.142*** 
  (6.83) 
CEO Duality 0.00477 -0.0409 
 (0.04) (-0.38) 
CEO Age 0.00325 0.00753** 
 (0.75) (1.98) 
Ownership % CEO -0.557*** -0.655*** 
 (-3.58) (-4.88) 
Board size 0.0208 0.0400 
 (0.52) (1.11) 
Female CEO -0.601*** -0.284 
 (-3.26) (-1.52) 
Female Chairman 0.272 0.423** 
 (1.11) (2.01) 
Females on the board -0.0525 -0.389 
 (-0.20) (-1.64) 
Constant 5.384*** 5.298*** 
 (16.40) (18.41) 
N 298 291 
R2 0.3503 0.4347 
adj. R2 0.3323 0.4187 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Assets are still positively correlated in both years. The coefficient of age is positive in both 
years and now significant at a five percent level in 2017. However, the coefficient is 
insignificant in 2018. The dummy variable for a female chairman is positively correlated with 
CEO compensation, and the effect is significant, looking at the 2017 numbers. This evidence 
suggests that a CEO that works under a female chairman receives 42.3 % higher compensation, 
all else equal.  
 
Figure 3 – Scatterplot of CEO pay and ownership percentages 
 
A scatterplot of CEO pay in 2018 and Ownership (Figure 3) shows the relationship between the 
two variables. It is relatively easy to observe the negative relationship between ownership 
percentage and pay. Nevertheless, the many zero, 50 %, and 100 % observations gather many 
observations on the left, the middle, and the right part of the scatterplot. The regressions in the 
previous section treat the dotted “line” of observations with zero percent ownership as the group 
of non-owners and rest as owners. The results in this section are clearly suggesting that owners 
earn less than non-owners, but it highlights the importance of ownership percentage. These 
results indicate that agency costs are apparent even when the CEO is an owner, but it is 
decreasing in ownership percentage.  
 
Using the 95 % confidence interval, an all else-equal estimation of the 2018 compensation of 
an owner would be:  
 
(3) 𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝑝𝑎𝑦JPON = 	𝐶𝐸𝑂	𝑝𝑎𝑦PJPGJPON ∗ (−0.56	 ± 0.31	) ∗ 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝	𝑝𝑐𝑡.	 
 
A slightly different estimate based on the 2017 confidence interval is: 
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It makes sense to think of the ownership percentage as a measure of how personally invested 
the CEO is in the business. If the personal investment is high, the compensation can be lower. 
This could be a result of the possibility of compensating oneself through dividends instead of 
salaries and bonuses. Dividends are more invisible than salaries, and owner CEOs may thus be 
motivated to hold back on salary payments. Besides, more dividend payments could also benefit 
the other owners, making them more likely to accept such arrangements for the CEO.  
Therefore, one cannot rule out the possibility that the results are due to self-serving reasons, and 
not linked to the owner CEOs being more inner motivated. However, since non-owners cannot 
be paid through dividends, the difference in compensation might still be an agency cost. One 
has to pay the non-owner significantly more because he or she is not as personally invested in 
the firm as owners are. Thus, there seems to be substance to the argument of Randøy and Nielsen 
(2002) that ownership shares could be used as a substitute for monitoring, indicating that the 
board could decrease compensation by offering the CEO shares in the company.  
Result 2: CEO pay is decreasing in CEO ownership percentage.  
6.2.3 Difference in pay sensitivity between owners and non-owners 
In this section, we are going to study the difference in pay sensitivity between owners and non-
owners. We first present two models with EBIT and ROA as a measure of performance. The 
effect of performance on change in CEO pay for owners compared to non-owners can be picked 
up by the interaction terms. In this case, we have multiplied the different measures of 
performance with the non-owner dummy. Note that we now look at the percentage change in 
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Table 10 – The sensitivity of CEO pay related to performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝚫CEO pay 18 𝚫CEO pay 18 𝚫CEO pay 17 𝚫CEO pay 17 
CEO Duality -0.0607 -0.0566 0.0789 0.118** 
 (-1.24) (-1.15) (1.35) (2.14) 
CEO Age -0.00181 -0.00209 -0.000419 -0.00314 
 (-1.01) (-1.23) (-0.29) (-1.27) 
Growth EBIT 17 -0.00327    
 (-1.10)    
N.O. growth EBIT 17 0.00376    
 (0.70)    
Growth EBIT 16 -0.00325  0.00171  
 (-1.58)  (0.98)  
N.O. growth EBIT 16 0.0111**  -0.00729  
 (2.37)  (-1.08)  
Growth EBIT 15   0.00192  
   (0.96)  
N.O. growth. EBIT 15   -0.00236  
   (-0.90)  
ROA 17  -0.000867   
  (-0.63)   
N.O. ROA 17  0.00213   
  (1.03)   
ROA 16  0.000156  0.00210** 
  (0.14)  (2.21) 
N.O. ROA 16  -0.00156  -0.00143 
  (-0.74)  (-0.79) 
ROA 15    -0.00124 
    (-1.63) 
N.O. ROA 15    0.000598 
    (0.42) 
Board size -0.0336* -0.0337* 0.0249 0.0462** 
 (-1.70) (-1.71) (1.47) (2.38) 
Assets 17 (ln) 0.0102 0.0114 0.00886 0.00678 
 (0.74) (0.84) (0.61) (0.51) 
Constant 0.183 0.186 -0.149 -0.0417 
 (1.40) (1.49) (-1.01) (-0.26) 
N 236 244 180 232 
R2 0.0429 0.0283 0.0506 0.0745 
adj. R2 0.0092 -0.0047 0.0061 0.0413 
All regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 10 shows the results of the models describing pay sensitivity. Model 1 uses EBIT as a 
measure of performance, and Model 2 uses ROA. Growth in EBIT from 2015 to 2016 does not 
have a significant impact on changes in CEO pay from 2017 to 2018 in general, but the growth 
for non-owners in the same period is significant at a five percent level. This finding supports 
our second hypothesis and suggests that the compensation of non-owners is more sensitive to 
performance. The changes in EBIT from 2016 to 2017 does not have a significant effect on 
changes in CEO pay from 2017 to 2018, but the sign of the coefficients does again support our 
hypothesis. Model 1 might also indicate that a change in performance takes some time to 
influence the pay. This seems plausible, as one year’s financial performance may not be 
available before a couple of months into the following year (e.g., through annual reports). Also, 
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renegotiation of compensation is unlikely done in “real-time”, leading to a lagged increase in 
compensation. 
 
ROA variables are insignificant for both years, and the signs of the coefficients are inconsistent. 
Summary statistics of the ROA variables (Table 7) showed much variation. The correlation 
matrix (Table 15 in the appendix) shows some correlation between ROA and growth in EBIT. 
However, the correlation is not very strong. Thus, it is not surprising that we see different results 
when we use these different variables as a proxy for performance.  
 
Model 3 and Model 4 examines the same as Model 1 and Model 2 but jumps back one year on 
both the dependent variable and the independent variables. Growth in EBIT from 2015 to 2016 
is insignificant and with different signs. Model 3 does not support Hypothesis 2. In Model 4, 
CEO duality is significant at a five percent level, and ROA in 2016 is significant at a ten percent 
level. The effect is though ambiguous, as the correlation is positive in 2016 and negative in 
2015. Board size is significant at a ten percent level in Model 1, 2, and 4. However, the signs of 
the coefficient are negative when using 2018 change in compensation and positive using 2017 
change. 
 
We observe a positive relationship between the increase in EBIT and pay. However, an issue 
with EBIT as a performance measure is that without controlling for exogenous shocks, the CEO 
could be rewarded and punished for events that is out of his or her control. For example, the 
shipping industry is highly dependent on the shipping rates, which is determined by the market 
(e.g., look at the OSLO Shipping Index which we mentioned in Section 6.1.1). If the industry is 
doing well, most firms experience growth in EBIT. If the company in question increases EBIT, 
but lower than the industry in general, the CEO should not be rewarded. On the other side, the 
CEO should be rewarded if the company experience a higher increase in EBIT than the industry 
in general. Furthermore, if the industry is doing well, this might increase the portability, and 
firms are more obliged to offer a bonus for the increased EBIT in order to retain their manager, 
even though the performance is below the industry average.  
 




Figure 4 confirms what we mentioned earlier about ROA and EBIT growth not following each 
other that well. This can be one reason we observe inconsistent results regarding pay-
performance sensitivity. Inconsistencies motivate us to do the same analysis using a different 
measure of performance, liquidity.  
 
 
Table 11 – The sensitivity of CEO pay related to performance, using liquidity ratio 
 (1) (2) 
 𝚫CEO pay 18 𝚫CEO pay 17 
CEO Duality -0.0505 0.104* 
 (-0.99) (1.95) 
CEO Age -0.00166 -0.00302 
 (-0.94) (-1.22) 
Liquidity 17 -0.00191  
 (-0.38)  
N.O. Liquidity 17 -0.00265  
 (-0.10)  
Liquidity 16 -0.00528 -0.00512 
 (-0.96) (-1.36) 
NO_Liquidity 16 -0.00343 -0.0273** 
 (-0.15) (-2.51) 
Liquidity 15  0.00112 
  (0.22) 
N.O. Liquidity 15  0.00762 
  (0.87) 
Board size -0.0288 0.0420** 
 (-1.46) (2.19) 
Assets 17 (ln) 0.0136 0.0131 
 (0.99) (0.94) 
Constant 0.142 -0.0685 
 (1.07) (-0.44) 
N 242 231 
R2 0.0285 0.0750 
adj. R2 -0.0049 0.0417 
Both regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The first model in Table 11 does not support our second hypothesis. In Model 2, the 
compensation of non-owners is negatively correlated using liquidity as a measure of firm 
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Figure 4 – Scatterplot of EBIT growth and ROA 
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hypothesis, as we expected a positive relationship. Numbers for 2015 show a positive 
relationship between performance and change in pay, but the coefficients are not significant. 
Like Model 4 in Table 10, we observe a positive correlation between CEO duality and board 
size for the change in pay in 2017. This effect is statistically significant at a ten percent and five 
percent level respectively. Liquidity ratio as a proxy of performance provides us with no 
evidence of higher pay-performance sensitivity for non-owners.  
Result 3: We find evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2 using EBIT as a 
performance measure, but no evidence using ROA and liquidity ratio. 
6.2.4 The theoretical applicability of our result 
Agency theory predicts that non-owners are compensated higher than owners, and that the 
compensation is more sensitive to performance. This fits with our empirical findings. 
Consequently, there is no evidence that owners exert their power to receive excess payments. 
CEO compensation is also decreasing with ownership percentage, which indicates that less 
incentives are needed when ownership increases. Both theories predict higher pay sensitivity of 
non-owners. Overall, we can conclude that agency theory is better at explaining CEO pay in 
Norwegian shipping firms. Results from similar studies on listed Norwegian firms indicate the 
same relationship between ownership and pay. However, empirical studies from different parts 
of the world typically find the opposite. Our survey answers are presented in Section 6.4 and 
will shed light on our findings and address the reasons behind them.  
6.3 Robustness of our results 
We will now discuss the adjustments we have done in our research due to robustness concerns, 
and why we might have some issues regarding endogeneity. The results of the various tests 
performed in this section also explain alterations done to the model in the previous section 
(Section 6.2). The tests are based on the Gauss-Markov assumptions described in Appendix A3.  
6.3.1 Linearity 
To check for linearity, we created a scatter plot (Appendix A2) of total CEO pay and total Assets. 
From the plots, we see that most of the data is placed in the bottom left corner, indicating that a 
log-transformation might be necessary. This also makes intuitive sense as linear-scale 
regressions inform on absolute changes while log-scale present the relative changes. When 
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discussing monetary sizes like compensation and assets, it is more expedient to talk about 
percentage changes and not absolute changes, as the firm sizes vary a lot in the dataset. By log 
transforming both Assets and CEO pay we get a much better scatter plot (Appendix A2). The 
summary statistics and scatterplots indicate that we should use the log of CEO pay in our 
analysis.  
 
The current model shows the changes in CEO pay as a constant percentage of the independent 
variables instead of providing an absolute number, which is more comparable across firms 
regarding firm size and other firm characteristics. The model is generically written as:  
 𝑙𝑛	(𝑦) = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2+. . . +	𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝑢	 
6.3.2 Multicollinearity  
Table 14 in the appendix shows a correlation between the different variables in our models 
studying differences in total pay. Correlations in the two first columns are not an issue, as CEO 
pay in 2018 and 2017 is our dependent variables. Unsurprisingly, CEO duality correlates with 
ownership percentage, and the dummy for non-owner is negatively correlated with ownership 
percentage. Board size correlates with most of the variables, and so does non-owner. However, 
the correlations are not very strong, and checking VIF values confirms that multicollinearity 
should not be a problem in these models.  
 
Moving on to the variables used for explaining the difference in pay sensitivity (Table 15 & 16 
in the appendix), the liquidity variables between the years are very correlated. At first sight, this 
is an indication that liquidity is relatively constant from year to year. Though, the other 
performance variables are not nearly as correlated with each other. The problems of 
multicollinearity are confirmed when looking at the VIF-values for our models on sensitivity. 
However, the issue does not appear in the actual analysis, because very large values that inflates 
correlation are removed as outliers. Thus, we do not have problems regarding multicollinearity 
in our analysis.   
6.3.3 Heteroskedasticity  
In order to ensure that our estimated coefficients are valid, we tested the data for 
heteroskedasticity. We used the White test and the Breusch-Pagan (BP) test, which both test the 
null hypothesis that homoskedasticity is present. The White test show little evidence of 
heteroskedasticity, but the BP test describes another picture. The BP test shows a clear rejection 
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of the null hypothesis in every model except the model with 2018 pay, indicating that 
heteroskedasticity is present in the other models.  
 
When using STATA, we can correct for heteroskedasticity by using the robust command. Now 
STATA will produce robust standard errors, t-tests, and confidence intervals in order to make 
our inference valid. The effects of using heteroskedasticity robust regressions are slim. The 
biggest change is regarding EBIT, which goes from being significant at a 10 percent level to the 
5 percent level (Table 10, Model 1). Moreover, we see a small change in the t-statistics of 
liquidity and board size, but these changes are so small that it does not affect our discussion. 
Since the use of robust show little changes, we are not worried that our analyses are invalid, but 
we used the robust command in relevant cases to ensure that our test statistics are not biased.  
6.3.4 Endogeneity  
Problems with endogeneity occur when the error term correlates with an explanatory variable. 
CEO tenure can be an example, as tenure possibly correlates with both pay and age. Endogeneity 
problems lead to biased OLS estimates, and problems of endogeneity should therefore be 
addressed (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 87). Another concern is the reason why some companies have 
owner CEOs and others not. To be an owner could be an endogenous choice, and there may be 
several things that the error term picks up that correlates with both the non-owner variable and 
our dependent variable. For example, if the firm is a family business, the CEO is more likely to 
be an owner. A family business may also be smaller than a large corporation. Thus, being a 
family business may be correlated to assets, the CEO being an owner, and CEO compensation. 
These are all cases of unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2008) portray two other types of endogeneity. Simultaneity happens 
when the explanatory variables are a function of the outcome variable. In our case, this might 
be an issue if CEO pay is important in describing firm performance. This can generate a bias in 
the estimates on how performance affects pay. Wintoki et al. (2008) also argue that there is a 
third and frequently overlooked source of endogeneity. The performance today might affect 
future board structures and governance choices, which in turn will affect firm performance in 
the future. A similar example can be used when thinking about ownership structures. The 
ownership structure today affects future ownership decisions, which will affect future 
performance. A problem can thus arise if ownership structure, or the fact that the CEO is an 
owner, both affect pay and performance.  
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6.3.5 Dealing with outliers in the models of pay-sensitivity 
The summary statistics in Table 7 indicate that there are some outliers in our variables on 
performance. A commonly used limit for outliers is three times the standard deviation from the 
mean. This suggests an upper limit between approximately 95 and 100 for ROA, based on the 
mean and standard deviation for all years. Therefore, we went for an upper outlier limit of 100. 
A lower limit of -82 was set using the same logic.  
 
The rule of thumb of three times the standard deviation from the mean is a bit trickier with 
growth in EBIT and liquidity. The reason is that the standard deviation and mean vary a lot 
between the years, while ROA is more consistent. Therefore, a visualization of the variables 
was necessary to look for outliers. After we removed the upper observation of liquidity from 
2016, an observation as high as 4711, we see the following distribution of observations (Figure 
5): 
 
        Figure 5 – Distribution of liquidity 2016 
 
Liquidity above 50 seems like outliers. The same pattern is visible, looking at liquidity for 2017 
and 2015. Therefore, we decided to remove liquidity observations above 50 for all the relevant 
years. Removing these outliers solved the problems of multicollinearity that we discussed 
earlier. There are no negative liquidity numbers, and we do not need to worry about negative 
outliers. A histogram of EBIT shows more or less the same as liquidity (Figure 6). The 2015 
and 2017 numbers also gave us an indication of negative and positive outliers below -50 and 
over 50 as well. Therefore, the decision regarding EBIT was to remove observations above 50 
and below -50. Regression results did change when we removed the largest (smallest) outliers, 


















    Figure 6 – Distribution of growth in EBIT 2016 
6.3.6 Limitations in our analysis 
Evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1 is present in both the descriptive statistics and the regressions. 
Though, one shortcoming of the model is that we are missing data on some of the CEO 
characteristics. These characteristics include education, tenure, skill level, and so on. For 
example, how long a CEO has worked in the company and been in the position as the top 
executive may reflect his level of pay. Regarding the variables on female CEOs and female 
chairmen, the numbers of observations are quite low. The validity of the estimates is affected 
by this, and we cannot confidently conclude on the gender effects. 
 
The analysis of pay-sensitivity shows inconsistent results. This is apparent because different 
measures show inconsistent correlation with the change in CEO pay, but also because the firms 
might use other performance measures when monitoring CEO performance. One possible issue 
is a change of CEO during the period we examined. This could lead to further inaccuracies 
regarding the change in pay, especially when looking at the change in compensation from 2016 
to 2017. The further away from today we examine pay sensitivity, the more likely it is that a 
change of the top executive has occurred. We have also discussed possible endogeneity 
problems in Section 6.3.4. Besides, the models examining pay-sensitivity show low adjusted R-
squares, indicating that the models do not explain much of the changes in pay.  
6.4 A qualitative survey on CEO pay 
To further investigate the dynamics of CEO compensation, we created a survey and sent it out 
to the top executives in our dataset. The purpose of the survey is to acquire deeper and wider 
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can capture factors regarding executive pay that might not be covered by the publicly available 
variables. This thesis has only used total cash compensation because it is the only form of 
compensation publicly available. However, stock options, pensions, and other perks may be just 
as crucial as cash compensation for some executives. In addition, the actual composition is not 
visible using financial statements. It is also interesting to map out what CEOs themselves 
consider the most important means of incentives.  
 
In the following subsections, we are going to present the questions that provide relevant and 
additional information regarding our earlier findings. The complete survey is placed in the 
Appendix together with the answers.  
Background on motivation 
The survey will address aspects of motivation and the following will include theory and 
background on this subject. We have discussed the need for proper incentives for the CEO to 
perform at the desired level. Incentives are meant to motivate managers to exert sufficient effort. 
Therefore, a motivated manager is essential in order to ensure the success of the company. 
However, we believe that the source of motivation differs from non-owners and owners.  
 
Intrinsic motivation comes from the work itself and provides the manager with a sense of 
purpose and meaningfulness (Thomas, 2009, p. 47-59). According to Thomas (2009), four 
specific intrinsic rewards makes a person feel particularly satisfied with their work; a sense of 
choice, a sense of meaningfulness, a sense of competence and a sense of progress. People who 
have a passion for the work they perform and feel that it is worth their time and energy, will 
have a sense of meaningfulness in their workday. Second, a worker who can use his personal 
judgments and act out of his own understanding will feel a sense of choice and independence. 
Thirdly, when having chosen a task to perform, the sense of competence comes from performing 
the task well and the feeling of succeeding in the job. The last reward Thomas (2009, p. 55) 
presents is a sense of progress. This reward is connected to the feeling of accomplishment and 
that the work is moving forward.  
 
Compensation based on money and other tangible benefits like bonuses, perks and commissions 
are forms of extrinsic rewards given to the manager. Monetary compensation is necessary 
because it motivates us, as well as being connected to a sense of justice, status, and value 
(Alvesson, 2011). However, new research states that there are other factors in our life that drive 
us besides money (Cappelen & Tungodden, 2012). Too much focus on performance and pay 
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could reduce the inner motivation of the worker (Alvesson, 2011; Kuvaas, 2019; Cappelen & 
Tungodden, 2012). Cappelen and Tungodden (2012) highlight the importance of moral 
motivation and argues that even though the economic aspect of the job is an essential source of 
motivation, people tend to make a trade-off between the monetary compensation and what they 
believe is right. 
 
The connection between monetary compensation and other forms of motivation incentives are 
important to understand in a pay-setting process. Using a hefty salary as a motivational incentive 
may have little effect if the manager already inhabits his desired welfare, and instead is 
motivated by work that he feels passionate about. A study conducted by Ariely, Gneezy, Mazar, 
and Loewenstein (2009) find that financial rewards are like a double-edged sword. They did 
several studies on people in different parts of the world and found that financial rewards, to a 
degree, will provide better performance. However, too large rewards will also induce stress, and 
because people get preoccupied with the compensation, the performance diminishes If the 
workers are weakly (or potentially very well) compensated, this could reduce their inner 
motivation and hurt their performance.  
 
As we have seen, monetary compensation is a mean to enhance performance to some degree. 
However, it is rarely the only thing that drives the manager, at least not after reaching a certain 
point of compensation. An owner is typically more tied to the company in terms of personal 
pride, social status, and capital. These factors are, to a much larger extent than for non-owners, 
determined by the firm performance. Moreover, since the company is their own, and possibly a 
company they have established from the ground, the owner CEO may have a greater belief in 
the firm and its purpose. Thus, we expect owner CEOs to be more satisfied with their work and 
more intrinsic rewarded throughout their day and while performing their tasks. 
6.4.2 Methodology  
The survey was sent out to the CEOs with public contact information, which amounted to a total 
of 224 CEOs. This number represents 54% of the total dataset. From the survey, we wanted to 
disclose characteristics about the CEOs and their compensation that the collected data could not 
provide. In order to compare the answers to the data we already inhabit, we asked about gender, 
age, and ownership. The goal is that the survey will provide us with new information that gives 
us more insight into our quantitative findings. Preferably, it will uncover how the CEOs are 
compensated besides fixed salary, and if the pay is coupled to performance. In addition, we 
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included a section about motivation as we believe this to be different for owners and non-
owners.  
 
The survey consisted of 20 questions. We chose to present most of the questions as multiple-
choice in order to make the survey feasible for the respondents. However, we included two open 
questions to get the CEOs’ comments on some main areas of our research. The purpose of these 
questions was to uncover how performance is measured and if the CEOs have any thoughts on 
why non-owners receive more compensation than owners.  
6.4.3 The respondents  
Of the 224 CEOs contacted, 66 responded. This constitutes a response rate of approximately 
29.5 %, which is satisfying. 76 % of the respondents are between 45 and 64 years. The poor 
gender balance in our dataset is illustrated by the fact that 95 % of the respondents were male. 
The share of owners is 60.6 %, which is approximately the same as in the dataset. In total, there 
were 40 owners and 26 non-owners that answered the survey. The ownership percentages of the 
respondents are presented in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 – Distribution of ownership percentage 
Furthermore, we asked questions about the education of the top executives. Most of the 
respondents had a master’s or bachelor’s degree, but quite a few had just high school or none 
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Figure 8 – The education of the respondents 
The average CEO has worked in the current company for fifteen years. The average tenure as 
the top executive is eleven and a half years, illustrating that the tenure in our dataset is 
considerably high. This information was not provided by our dataset and is thus interesting to 
observe. We have mentioned how missing tenure could be a problem in our model as we are 
not able to observe the extent of portability within the industry. These findings indicate that the 
level of portability is low. Whether or not this is due to the companies paying high salaries to 
retain talent or not is difficult to say. However, it seems unlikely that people stay in a company 
for fifteen years because of the compensation alone. 
6.4.4 Results 
The composition of CEO compensation 
The question on the composition of CEO compensation is essential to understand pay 
sensitivity. Based on the theory we have presented and our analysis, we expect that the non-
owners receive more performance-based pay than owners. The results are summarized in Figure 
9.  
 
Except for one respondent, all of the CEOs answered that they receive a base salary. However, 
the key finding is that as much as 65.4 % of the non-owners responded that they receive 
performance-based bonuses, while only 17.5 % of the owners responded the same. Thus, the 
managerial power perspective seems to fit the owners’ answers regarding performance-based 
pay. The answers clearly indicate that non-owners have higher pay sensitivity related to 
performance, which is supported by agency theory. On the other side, if the performance is 
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earn more than owners if the industry generally is doing good. Thus, this finding is evidence in 
favor of Hypothesis 2, while it also can explain why non-owners earn that much more.  
 
 
Figure 9 – The composition of CEO pay 
 
Continuing, we asked how performance is measured. This was an open question, which 22 of 
the respondents answered. In our OLS analysis, we used a total of three performance measures, 
EBIT, ROA and liquidity ratio. In the analysis, we find indications that EBIT might be used as 
a performance measure in the shipping industry. ROA and liquidity, on the other hand, did not 
appear to be related to the changes in compensation. According to the survey, profits the most 
commonly used measure for performance, reported by 45 % of the respondents. It is unclear 
how profits are measured. One likely measure is meeting a predetermined profit goal. 
Nevertheless, one respondent explicitly replied that he received a percentage of the profits as a 
bonus, signifying that there are several ways of measuring performance based on profits. 
Furthermore, 32 % answered that their performance was measured by KPI’s, but they did not 
specify if these were financial or non-financial. 
 
EBIT or EBITDA was reported by 18 % of the respondents. EBIT can be closely related to 
profits, which could be the reason we observed a relationship with EBIT and growth in 
compensation in Section 6.2.3. On the other side, profits can also differ substantially from EBIT 
since financial income and costs often are significant. An important question is then if it is the 
level or the growth in EBIT that is used as a performance indicator. Generally, it seems likely 
that performance indicators differ from company to company. The key takeaway is that there 
are many different practices in measuring performance. This could, in turn, make it challenging 
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statements. However, the survey answers confirm that non-owners receive more performance-
based bonuses.  
Result 4: Non-owner CEOs receive performance-based bonuses to a higher 
extent than owner CEOs.  
 
 
From the survey, we wanted to discover if the top executives themselves regard their 
compensation as sensitive to performance. Based on the analysis in Section 6.2 and Result 4, 
we would expect that non-owners, to a larger extent, believe that their compensation is affected 
by performance. The survey answers confirm this. The evidence is much clearer when looking 
at CEO performance (Figure 10) instead of firm performance (Figure 11). However, some 
owners also report that compensation is affected by performance. Since the owners have more 
stakes in the company, it is natural that they regulate their own compensation and dividends to 
whether the firm does well or not. It seems highly unlikely that an owner will provide himself 
with a bonus or high salary if the company is struggling to meet ends.  
 
 
Figure 10 – CEO compensation and CEO performance 
Over 60% of the non-owners state that performance, both firm and individual, have an impact 
on their compensation. An interesting observation is that none of the non-owners respond that 
their compensation is not affected by their performance, while 26 % of the owners state that 
individual performance has little to no impact on their pay. Thus, Figure 10 and Figure 11 do, 
to some extent, support our hypothesis of non-owners having a higher degree of pay sensitivity. 
The findings are also consistent with the agency theory regarding incentivizing the agent to 

















Strongly disagree Partially disagree Neutral Partially agree Strongly agree
My compensation is affected by my own performance
Non-owners Owners
  59 
 
 
Figure 11 – CEO compensation and firm performance 
 
Furthermore, we asked to what degree the CEOs could influence their pay. There is clear 
evidence of owners inhabiting a higher degree of power in the pay-setting process than the non-
owners. A third of the owners respond that they can affect their pay to a very large extent (see 
Appendix A6 "Q15…"). None of the non-owners feel the same, but 15% state that they have 
a large influence on their pay. The remaining non-owners claim that they 
have some or little influence regarding their compensation. This is not surprising as they are 
hired and compensated within the boundaries of the company. 
 
We observe that 77% of the non-owners renegotiate their compensation every year, allowing 
their contracts to be adjusted based on last years’ merits (see Appendix A6 "Q16…"). This makes 
sense if their pay is more performance-based and thus require adjustments more often. Company 
goals may differ from year to year, and it is reasonable to renegotiate more frequently if one 
aspires to incentivize the top executive sufficiently. When looking at the owners, 43% say that 
they renegotiate every year and 23 % every other year. The last fraction of owners (3 CEOs) 
responded that the renegotiation takes place outside the listed categories. When asked to specify, 
most answers were "never" or "when needed." 
The CEOs’ perspective on Result 1 
We continued to ask the CEOs why they believe our findings indicate that non-owners receive 
more compensation than owners. The purpose was to capture a more nuanced picture of our 
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question was open for comments and answered by 49 of the respondents, 31 owners, and 18 
non-owners.  
 
Owners and the non-owners seem to have a different understanding of why owners earn less. 
More than half of the non-owners believe that the owners earn less because they have the 
possibility of taking out dividends. However, from our question earlier in the survey, we find 
that 75% of the owners rarely or never pay out dividends to complement their regular pay. 
Instead, the owners seem to agree that self-interest in the company is a great part of the 
explanation. They emphasize loyalty, motivation, and responsibility towards the company. 
Moreover, a few mentions that being an owner is a form of compensation itself and that it is 
better to save the money in the firm. This way, the owner can enjoy the increase in stock value, 
rather than paying out high salaries.  
 
Many also emphasize that the opposite applies to the non-owners. Since they have no personal 
stakes in the company, they are not affected by poor outcomes in the same way.  Thus, they 
need to be more monetary incentivized. A few also mention that there is a market for CEOs, 
and when hiring external managers, they must compensate accordingly in order to attract and 
retain talents. 
 
 “I agree with this hypothesis. I was once a manager in a company where I held the 
majority ownership. My salary at that time was substantially lower than the one I 
receive now after we have gotten professional co-owners.” 
- Non-owner 
 
The last interesting finding of this question is that a few of the owners seem to keep their salary 
to a minimal level, deliberately in order to send a positive signal and keep the general wage 
level from increasing too much. This relates to owners having a personal stake in the firm as 
salaries constitute a large part of the firm’s fixed costs. It seems plausible that owners are more 
focused on keeping the costs down as this directly affects the value of their ownership shares. 
As for sending a positive signal, it might be motivating for the employees to know that the top 
executive does not earn multiple times what they do. This indicate that social norms in Norway 
restrict managerial power.  
  
“An owner is more loyal to the company and wishes to keep the general wage level in 
the firm down. If the top executive receives high compensation, this will often cause the 
general wage level in the company to increase as well.” 
- Owner 
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Individual perception of variation, security and pay as motivation 
We wanted to figure out how the CEOs perceive their own compensation regarding variation, 
motivation, and security. In terms of variation, we observe that most of the CEOs do not feel 
that their compensation varies a lot from year to year (Table 12). In total, there is not much 
separating owners and non-owners regarding this question, and it seems like the compensation 
on average experience little variation.  
 
Table 12 – The CEOs’ perception of variation, pay as motivation and pay security 








My compensation varies a lot 
from year to year 
 
Non-owners 39 % 27 % 19 % 14 % 2 % 
Owners 42 % 24 % 21 % 11 % 3 % 
Pay is the most important 
source of motivation at work 
Non-owners 19 % 23 % 27 % 27 % 4 % 
Owners 34 % 29 % 21 % 16 %  0 % 
Pay security is important for 
me 
Non-owners 4 % 4 % 23 % 31 % 38 % 
Owners 8 % 0 % 26 % 41 % 26 % 
Note: percentages are rounded up/down 
Next, we asked if compensation is the most important source of motivation for the CEOs and if 
pay security is essential in their everyday life. Both groups generally disagree with 
compensation being the crucial motivational factor. A higher portion of the non-owners claim 
neutral or agreeing to the statement. This could be an indication that non-owners are more 
motivated by pay. Both the owners and the non-owners seem to agree that pay security is vital 
for them. Still, there is a higher percentage of owners strongly disagreeing with the statement, 
further indicating that owners are less motivated by pay. This is also consistent with agency 
theory as non-owners need to be compensated for their risk and cost of effort.  
 
Motivation 
Since the non-owners observably receive a much higher level of compensation, we wanted to 
investigate if this could be a result of motivation at work. Due to the owner’s self-interest in the 
company and the gap in pay found between owners and non-owners in Section 6.2.1, we expect 
that owners are less motivated by external sources like pay and status.  
 
The motivational question in Table 12 tries to uncover if monetary compensation is the most 
essential source of motivation. Nevertheless, motivation is complex, and a combination of 
sources likely motivates people. In order to further investigate what motivates the CEO’s in 
their work, we included a question with nine statements regarding motivation (Table 13). The 
range of questions spans from ordinary base salary as motivation, to the motivation of being a 
 62
positive contributor to society. The questions are designed to reflect intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation. A side note to this part of the survey is that not all the owners responded to these 
questions.  
 
There is some difference in the owners’ and non-owners’ responses regarding base salary (Table 
13). 70 % of the non-owner’s state that they partially or strongly agree with base salary being a 
source of motivation, while only 46 % of the owners state the same. However, there is a higher 
degree of owners being neutral to the question compared to non-owners, and only four 
percentage-points dividing the two groups on the other end of the scale. Owners disagree 
slightly more regarding base salary. Hence, there are some slight indications that non-owners 
are more preoccupied with the monthly base-salary than the owners. Looking at the 
performance-based compensation, we see the same pattern. Non-owners seem to be more 
concerned with how they are compensated, and performance measures motivate over half of the 
respondents. This could be explained by the owners’ stake in the firm.  Therefore, they do not 
need as many extrinsic rewards in order to perform. These answers match the findings we 
discussed in the subsection above and predictions from agency theory.  
 
Table 13 – The CEOs’ opinions on what motivates them 










Non-owners 12 % 0 % 19 % 58 % 12 % 
Owners 8 % 8 % 38 % 30 % 16 % 
Performance-based pay  Non-owners 8 % 0 % 35 % 35 % 23 % 
Owners 15 % 6 % 45 % 27 %  6 % 
Flexibility at work  
 
Non-owners 4 % 4 % 23 % 46 % 23 % 
Owners 3 % 5 % 19 % 32 % 41 % 
Status and career options  Non-owners 0 % 15 % 42 % 31 % 12 % 
Owners 24 % 14 % 41 % 19 % 3 % 
Personal success at work  Non-owners 0 % 4 % 12 % 38 % 46 % 
Owners 3 % 5 % 14 % 43 % 35 % 
Affiliation with the company  Non-owners 4 % 0 % 15 % 35 % 46 % 
Owners 0 % 0 % 13 % 29 % 58 % 
The success of the company  Non-owners 4 % 0 % 8 % 35 % 54 % 
Owners 0 % 0 % 3 % 29 % 68 %  
Challenges and sense of 
achievement  
Non-owners 4 % 0 % 4 % 23 % 69 % 
Owners 3 % 0 % 3 % 32 % 63 % 
Being a positive contributor 
to society 
Non-owners 4 % 0 % 8 % 62 % 27 % 
Owners 3 % 0 % 21 % 33 % 44 % 
    Note: percentages are rounded up/down 
 
Regarding status and career opportunities, there seems to be a clear pattern towards non-owners 
being more motivated by this (43 % against 22 %), which is a result that is not particularly 
surprising. Owners have likely been a part of starting the firm, or it is a part of their family 
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legacy. If they have invested in the firm later, they probably believe in the firm in terms of 
purpose and success. This provides the owners with a higher affiliation with the company, which 
we also observe to some extent from the survey. Another explanation could be that non-owner 
CEOs are inherently more ambitious since they have worked their way up to the position as a 
top executive. As a result of this, they may naturally care more about status and how they are 
perceived compared to the owner CEOs.  
 
 
Both groups report that they are highly motivated by flexibility at work, but owners to a greater 
extent than non-owners. Flexibility could be tied to a sense of choice, which Thomas (2009, 
p.53) listed as one of the four intrinsic rewards. The personal stake for owners is somewhat 
reflected in the question regarding the success of the business. From the survey, we get our 
expectations confirmed. 97 % of the owners agree that the success of the firm is an essential 
source of motivation. However, this also seems to be essential for the non-owners, and a total 
of 87 % agreed to the statement. On the other side, non-owners appear to be somewhat more 
motivated by personal success than the owners.  
 
Non-owners are more motivated by challenges and a sense of achievement in their daily work. 
However, the most surprising result is the motivation of being a positive contributor to society. 
44 % of the owners strongly agree that being a positive contributor is motivating. However, 
when combining partially and strongly agree, we observe that non-owners in total find this more 
motivating than the owners (88 % compared to 79 %). 21 % of the owners are neutral. This is 
unexpected as we would assume that owners felt more of a connection between their company 
and society. However, there is not a major difference between the two groups, and overall, there 
seems to be much motivation in knowing that one contributes positively to society.  
 
To sum up our findings regarding motivation at work, there are some differences between the 
two groups according to the answers. There is a pattern that non-owners score higher on 
extrinsic motivation, while owners score higher on intrinsic motivation. This does fit with our 
expectations, but because of our small sample, it is difficult to conclude with certainty. 
6.4.5 Conclutions from the survey 
The survey uncovered characteristics with the CEOs and their compensation that our data alone 
could not provide. Firstly, there appear to be differences in the pay composition, where non-
owners receive performance-based compensation to a greater extent than owners. Non-owners 
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also claim that their compensation is greatly affected by individual performance. Our survey 
answers further reveal that the average tenure, both in the firm and as the CEO is high, which 
indicates that the top executives in the industry rarely move between companies.  Regarding the 
CEOs’ perspective on Result 1, non-owners believe that the difference in compensation between 
the groups is mainly related to dividend payments. Most owners, on the other hand, believe that 
the difference has to do with inner motivation, cautiousness, and commitment to the firm. When 
it comes to motivation at work, there is some evidence that non-owners are more motivated by 
extrinsic factors while owners are more intrinsic motivated. 
Limitations in our survey data 
First, our answers may be biased. We could only find contact information on 54 % of the firms 
in our dataset, which could cause problems if there is a particular reason why some of the 
information is not publicly available. Small companies may be a lot more challenging to track 
down than larger and more renowned firms. If this is the case, our sample of respondents may 
be skewed. Second, even though the response rate was approximately 30 %, we would have 
benefited from a larger set of answers. Lastly, there is always the possibility of 
misunderstanding and, thus, answers that do not reflect the CEO’s real opinion. Nevertheless, 
we believe that the survey answers help us understand the dynamics of the CEO pay better. It 
is important to acknowledge that there might be some weaknesses in the survey and that we, 
therefore, must be critical when reviewing the answers. Nonetheless, we feel that the survey 
helped us validate the findings from the regressions and gave us more insight into our data. The 
CEO’s reflections give us additional and interesting information about how they perceive the 
compensation gap. 
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7. Conclusion 
We study the effect of ownership structures on CEO pay. Our approach differs from existing 
literature because we gather data on CEO compensation from unlisted firms in the Norwegian 
shipping and sea transport industry. The purpose is to disclose if non-owner CEOs receive 
higher compensation than owner CEOs and if their salary is more coupled to performance. By 
studying unlisted companies, the thesis provides insights into an area with limited research. The 
analysis is based on OLS regressions, and a qualitative survey sent out to the top executives in 
our dataset. Two main theories are tested; agency theory and the managerial power perspective.  
 
Our first result is that non-owner CEOs are compensated substantially more than owners, on 
average between 39 % and 47 %, which is evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1. The difference is 
significant for both 2017 and 2018 and appears to be an agency cost in order to compensate the 
non-owners for incentive purposes and risk reduction. We also find evidence that the difference 
in pay increases with ownership percentage. This indicates that ownership could be used to 
reduce agency problems and as a substitute for cash compensation. Former research on 
ownership and compensation conducted on listed companies in Norway and Sweden provides 
the same findings. Hence, listed and unlisted companies in Norway seem to share similar 
characteristics regarding ownership structures and executive compensation. Over half of the 
non-owners believe the difference in pay is due to the possibility of dividends for owners. 
Owners highlight inner motivation, cautiousness, and commitment as essential explanations. 
Looking at the owners, as much as 75 % state that they rarely or never take out any dividends 
instead of salary. Overall, agency theory provides the best predictions for the relationship 
between ownership and CEO pay in our data.  
 
We find some evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2, that the compensation of non-owners is more 
sensitive to firm performance. This is apparent when using growth in EBIT as a performance 
measure. Other models using ROA and liquidity does not provide any evidence in favor of the 
second hypothesis. However, our survey showed that approximately 65 % of the non-owners 
receive performance-based bonuses, while approximately 18 % of the owners responded the 
same. This supports our finding of higher pay sensitivity for non-owners. Nevertheless, the 
performance measures seem to vary from firm to firm, which is likely a reason we did not find 
any sign of higher pay sensitivity when using ROA and liquidity. Profits are the most used 
performance measure according to the CEOs themselves, but unspecified KPI’s and EBIT are 
also reported as measures. Furthermore, we find that non-owners score a little higher on 
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extrinsic motivation while owners score higher on intrinsic motivation. Overall, predictions 
from agency theory fits our data better than predictions from the managerial power perspective.  
 
Our dataset has a few limitations. A sample bias may be present due to companies reporting 
CEO compensation as zero in the financial statements. Another sample bias may be present in 
our survey answers, as we could only find contact information for approximately half of the 
dataset. The response rate is quite good, but we would benefit from a larger sample. Endogeneity 
related to whether the CEO is an owner or not is also a potential issue. Inaccuracies in the 
historical data may be present due to a change of the top executive during the relevant years. 
Though, our survey indicates that most CEOs have been at the current position for a long 
time.                                                                                                
 
Recommendations for future research 
There are many ways of researching CEO compensation. In our study, we have focused on the 
Norwegian shipping industry and mainly studied one year at the time. For further research, it 
could be interesting to compare CEO compensation across borders, as we have seen from 
comparable studies that ownership does not have the same effect on pay in different geographic 
regions. We believe the forces behind this would be fascinating to research and understand. In 
addition, it could be interesting to study ownership over a more extended time period in order 
to fully understand the effect of performance. Finally, there are some interesting findings 
regarding gender and CEO compensation. Due to a small sample of females, we recommend 
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Appendix 
A1 – Histograms of CEO pay, level and log 
 
Figure 12 – Histogram of total level CEO pay 2018 
 












































Figure 14 – Histogram of total log CEO pay 2018 
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A2 – Scatterplots  of CEO pay and control variables 
 









































Figure 18 – Scatterplot of level CEO pay and CEO age 
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A3 – Assumptions for OLS regressions, Gauss-Markov 
theorem  
The Gauss-Markov theorem states that if the data fulfil a set of assumptions, the OLS method 
is the “best linear unbiased estimator” (BLUE), and thereby justifying the use of this method 
over any other competing estimator (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 102). In the following, we will go 
through the assumptions as a basis for our research.  
Linearity  
The first assumption is that the multiple regression follows a linear model written as:  𝑦 = βo + β1𝑥1 + β2𝑥2+. . . +	βk𝑥𝑘 + 𝑢	 	
For the model to be linear, it has to be linear in the parameters β + βH + β3+. . . +	β.		These 
parameters determine the direction and strengths of the relationship between y and the 
independent variables x1, x2, and so on (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 71). 			
When the model is linear, the linear regression can fit a straight line through the data. When 
the assumption is violated, the data will no longer follow a straight line. This will cause the 
estimates to be biased.  
Random sampling 
The next assumption is that we have a random sample n, {(𝑥𝑖H, 𝑥𝑖3, … , 𝑛𝑖i, 𝑦𝑖):	𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛} 
of the population in question. This means that all individuals of the population have an equal 
possibility of being drawn. We can thus write the equation above in terms of random sample 
like this:  𝑦) = 𝛽𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑥𝑖1 + 𝛽𝑖2𝑥𝑖2+. . . +𝛽𝑖𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛		 
 
 
i denotes the observation in the sample, and the subscript reflects the variable number on x.  
 
An advantage of cross-sectional data is that one can often assume that they represent a random 
sample of the population where all members of the population are equally likely to be included 
in the analysis (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 6). Our dataset, however, most likely have a sample 
selection problem, meaning that it is not appropriate to assume that it is a random sample. The 
reason for this is that a big fraction of Norwegian shipping businesses has not reported any CEO 
compensation. This could be due to reporting errors, failing to report or that the CEO is being 
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paid by a different company in the same group. Moreover, it could also be that the company is 
newly started resulting in the CEO not being able to take out salary and thus that there is nothing 
to report in the current year.  
No perfect collinearity 
The third assumption is that there should be no exact linear relationship between the 
independent variables in the sample, and thus in the population. The independent variables can 
be correlated but not perfectly correlated. In fact, in a multiple regression, we include variables 
we expect to be correlated so that we can hold them fixed in the analysis (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 
84).   
 
If some of the independent variables in our model are highly correlated with each other, we 
have multicollinearity. The problem regarding multicollinearity is that the model will not be 
able to estimate the relationship between the dependent and independent variables precisely. If 
two independent variables in our model are highly correlated, there will be problems in 
estimating how the variables are correlated with the dependent variable. The standard errors are 
also likely to be too high. The signs and size of the coefficients might vary between different 
samples. VIF-values can be used to check for multicollinearity. A score below 10 should be 
tolerated, but a value below 5 is preferred (StatisticsSolutions, n.d.). A correlation matrix of our 
variables will give us an indication of potential multicollinearity problems.  
Zero conditional mean  
The most crucial assumption for unbiasedness is the assumption of “zero conditional mean” 
which states that the expected value of u, the error term, is zero for any given value of the 
explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 86). This can be shown as followed: 
 𝐸(𝑢|𝑥H, 𝑥3, …	, 𝑥i) = 0	 
 
If the assumption of zero conditional mean holds, we say that we have exogenous independent 
variables. However, if the 𝐸(𝑢|𝑥H, 𝑥3, …	, 𝑥i) ≠ 0, we use the term endougenous independent 
variables (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 87). 
 
There are a variety of things that could cause the assumption of zero conditional mean to fail. 
For example, one needs to ensure that the model is not misspecified. This could be the case if 
one forgets to include a quadratic term in the equation or that one use level variables when the 
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true model require log variables. We will also get a problem if we omit an important factor that 
is correlated with 𝑥H, 𝑥3, …	, 𝑥i, which will cause omitted variable bias and cause the assumption 
to fail (Wooldridge, 2013, pp. 88-89). The assumption of zero conditional mean put restrictions 
on the relationship between the explanatory variables and the unobserved variables in the error 
term u (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 87). 
Homoskedasticity  
The last assumption states that the error, u, should have the same variance for all values of the 
explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 93). Written as:  
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢|𝑥H, … , 𝑥i) = 𝜎3 
 
Meaning that the variance of the error term is independent of the explanatory variables 𝑥H, 𝑥3, …	, 𝑥i. When this is true the model display homoscedasticity, and if the assumption fails 
it display heteroskedasticity. When heteroskedasticity is present, the variance changes with the 
independent variables in the model (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 93).  
 
Unlike the assumptions above, a violation the homoskedasticity assumption does not impact the 
unbiasedness and consistency in the OLS estimators, nor does it affect the interpretation of R-
squared and adjusted R-squared. However, it will affect the estimator's variance and cause 
Var(βj) to be biased. Since the OLS standard errors is based directly on the variances, 
heteroskedasticity causes them to be invalid in terms of constructing confidence intervals and 
t-statistics, as well as F-statistics. Thus, the statistics used to test hypotheses are not valid in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. Since hypothesis testing is such a big part of the econometric 
analysis, heteroskedasticity cause the OLS inference to be faulty and we cannot say that OLS is 
the most efficient estimator (Wooldridge, 2013, pp. 94-95). 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, when all of the Gauss-Markov assumptions 
hold, the OLS regression is the best linear unbiased estimator for the population parameters:  





A4 – Correlation matrices 
Table 14 – Correlation matrix, differences in CEO pay 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
   (1)CEO pay 18  1.000 
   (2)Assets 18 0.529*** 1.000 
   (3)CEO pay 17  0.894*** 0.586*** 1.000 
   (4)Assets 17 0.523*** 0.941*** 0.574*** 1.000 
   (5)CEO Duality -0.291*** -0.411*** -0.367*** -0.366*** 1.000 
   (6)CEO Age 0.023 0.050 0.047 0.042 0.105** 1.000 
   (7)Ownership %       
CEO 
-0.439*** -0.523*** -0.527*** -0.492*** 0.615*** 0.099* 1.000 
   (8)Non-owner 0.430*** 0.375*** 0.440*** 0.351*** -0.372*** 0.023 -0.670*** 1.000 
   (9)Board size 0.348*** 0.541*** 0.422*** 0.526*** -0.568*** -0.015 -0.536*** 0.333*** 1.000 
   (10)Female CEO -0.131** -0.033 -0.069 -0.054 -0.031 -0.020 -0.085* 0.090* 0.058 1.000 
   (11)Female                  
Chairman 
0.018 -0.059 0.049 -0.041 -0.066 -0.116** -0.045 0.040 0.051 0.333*** 1.000 
   (12)Females on the   
board 
-0.004 -0.022 -0.001 -0.004 -0.093* -0.051 -0.090* 0.069 0.126** 0.340*** 0.656*** 1.000 
 

















































Table 15 – Correlation m
atrix, change in CEO
 pay, 2018-m
odel  
 Table 16 – Correlation m








A5 – The survey  
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A6 – The survey answers  
Note that the survey is translated from Norwegian.  
 








































Q6 – If you’re an owner, how often do you take out  























Level of education Count 
High school 18 
Bachelor's degree 13 
Master's degree 29 
None of the above 6 
Total 66 




Ownership percentage Count 

















Q2 – How old are you? 






How often do you take out 
dividends instead of salary?
Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never
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Q8 - Do you have a position on the board in the company you lead? 







Q9 – How many years have you worked in your current firm:  Average of 15 years.  
 
 
Q10 – How long have you been in your current position:  Average of 11,5 years.  
 
 
Q11 - Which of the following forms of compensation do you receive? 
 Base-salary 
Performance-
based bonus Pension plans Stock options Other 
Owners 40 (100 %) 7 (17.5 %) 19 (47.5 %) 3 (7.5 %) 5 (7.6 %) 
Non-owners 25 (96.2 %) 17 (65.4 %) 16 (61.5 %) 1 (3.8 %) 3 (4.5 %) 
 
 
Other, please specify: 
Car allowance  
Rental of real estate 
Fixed salary 
Forced to take out dividends to pay wealth tax 

















Owners 5 (13 %) 2 (5 %) 13 (33 %) 15 (38 %) 5 (13 %) 40 (100 %) 
Non-owners 3 (12 %) 1 (4 %) 6 (23 %) 11 (42 %) 5 (19 %) 26 (100 %) 
 
 
Dividends vary with 
firm performance Count 
To a very large extent 12 
To a large extent 7 
To some extent 1 
To a small extent 4 
To a very small extent 2 
Total 26 
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Owners 9 (23 %) 1 (3 %) 17 (43 %) 8 (20 %) 5 (13 %) 40 (100 %) 
Non-owners 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %) 10 (38 %) 13 (50 %) 3 (12 %) 26 (100 %) 
      
 
Q14 - If you receive performance-based bonus, how is your performance measured? 
 
2.75 % of net profits  
Financial results and other KPI’s 
Profits before taxes 
No bonus – dividend when the liquidity and profits allow it  
Only dividends – Poor performance 0 dividends 
EBIT and how you perform above the yearly budget  
Profits and discretion  
Profits, KPI  
Key numbers 
Discretionary based on profits 
Pre-defined targets both financial and non-financial  
Based on the development in variable unit cost  
Performance kicks in only if the firm’s profit goals are met. Performance is when the 
company is able to ‘perform’.   
Against specific kriterias/goals.  




Discretionary by the board  
Partially company specific goals and profits, partially mother company/group profits, 
partially individual results.  
 
 



















Owners Percent Count 
To a very large extent 30 % 12 
To a large extent 23 % 9 
To some extent 38 % 15 
To a small extent 8 % 3 
To a very small 
extent 3 % 1 
Total  40 
Non-owners Percent Count 
To a very large extent 0 % 0 
To a large extent 15 % 4 
To some extent 54 % 14 
To a small extent 31 % 8 
To a very small extent 0 % 0 
Total  26 
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Q16 - How often is your compensation renegotiated? 
 
Owners Count 
Every other year 9 
Every year 17 

















































Every other year 3 
Every year 20 




When needed and possible 2 
When needed 2 
Based on the National Insurance scheme 1 
Every three to five years 1 
Based on long-term budget 1 
Yearly based on price index 1 





When needed 1 
Total 3 
Owners Count 
To a very large extent 12 
To a large extent 8 
To some extent 9 
To a small extent 8 
To a very small extent 3 
Total 40 
Non-owners Count 
To a very large extent 3 
To a large extent 11 
To some extent 11 
To a small extent 0 
To a very small extent 1 
Total 40 
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Q18 - Our results indicate that CEOs that does NOT have ownership shares in the company receive higher 
compensation than CEOs with ownership shares. Why do you think this is the case? (Note: we have 
translated the answers from Norwegian) 
 
Ownership Comments on Result 1 
Yes Owners focus on the firm’s financial strength and future stock value. A hired 
CEO focuses on short-term revenue  
Yes CEOs with ownership shares evaluate their salary against the economy of the 
firm. They simply put the firm’s wellbeing above own compensation 
No Possibility of dividends with lower taxation.   
No Possibility of dividends. The size of the firm surely plays a role. I assume that 
there are more CEOs that have ownership shares in small firms than in big firms. 
Larger firms probably have a greater ability to pay higher wages.  
Yes Ownership shares inspires to increased effort for future gain, while with no 
ownership you do not see the future gain.  
Yes Tax-motivated. Better to save in your own company than to burden the firm with 
high fixed salary.  
Yes Is independent of consequences if the company performs poorly as oppose to an 
owner.  
  
Yes We owners must show moderation. Every invoice must be paid before you think 




Because the majority shareholder believe he is better off by keeping ownership 
and management separated.   
  
Yes Responsibility   
Yes Because without ownership the CEO must be motivated by something else, 
which often is salary.  
  
Yes Owner values compensates for salary 
Yes An owner is more loyal to the company and wishes to keep the general wage level 
in the firm down. If the top executive receives high compensation, this will often 
cause the general wage level in the company to increase as well 
No It is possible they can compensate with dividends. By hiring an external CEO 
without ownership shares, you have to pay market salary for a CEO with the right 
competence.  
  
Yes Owners are more loyal to their firm.  
Yes With ownership comes a different (better) motivation. In addition, an owner-
CEO will think that higher salary means higher general wage level and therefore 
less dividends.  
No The companies are bigger.  
Yes Dividends can be viewed as a part of salary.  
No Ownership shares is compensation.  
Yes When you sit on both sides of the fence with 100 % ownership, you see that the 
money yields a higher return on the company side than the private side.  
Yes To achieve a total compensation package. 
Yes Commitment 
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No Because a non-owner CEO does not have the upside of the owner regarding 
profitability   
  
Yes I agree with this hypothesis. I was once a manager in a company where I held the 
majority ownership. My salary at that time was substantially lower than the one I 
receive now after we have gotten professional co-owners. 
No Because an owner with a significant ownership share gets paid partly through the 
ownership share, while a non-owner CEO is only compensated through salary.  
No Tax considerations. If you have enough to live, the money may as well stay in the 
company and build it. 
  
Yes With ownership shares you take more responsibility for the firm, and gladly take 
out less salary if it can help the firm in a year with less operation. 
Yes I think that this is correct. If you are to have a competent CEO you must pay, 
and if you don’t get dividends the compensation needs to be higher.  
Yes They look at total compensation and then the sum must be fairly similar. I.e. 
without stocks the base-salary and/or bonus must be higher.  
No Dividends are taken out instead of salary.  
Yes Because they are closer to the firm and have an interest to build a solid firm. In 
our industry, there is a shortage of suitable CEOs, thus external persons need to 
be compensated accordingly.  
  
Yes That owner CEOs is more cautious about taking out salaries.  
Yes Owners are more cautious in regard to the survival of the company! 
Yes They lack the ownership entrepreneurial drive, a non-owner CEO in a company 
will never invest private funds in the firm! A non-owner will probably just let go 
and leave if he does not achieve the expectations. An owner-CEO has probably 
often invested significantly with his own funds and often thinks long-term, and 
not often adjust their own salary to protect the firm in challenging times (can 
probably say a lot more about this topic) 
No Owners wish a safe future for the company – rather takes out dividends if there is 
a possibility for that 
  
Yes In a family company, it is always difficult to discuss compensation with them that 
work in the company. I think that you are generally under-paid as an owner and 
CEO in family companies. 
  
No Because owner CEOs maybe are expected to affect dividends and hence get paid 
for their efforts through ownership. A non-owner without this opportunity 
expects to get better compensation and does maybe not have the risk of getting 
lower pay if the results becomes poorer (within limits). 
  
No Owner CEOs do often have other incentives in addition to salary.   
No The size of the firm may have something to do with it. Also, in what phase the 
company is in (a start-up must give compensation in form of stocks, while a more 
established company gives compensation more through actual salary).  
  
Yes Because non-owner CEOs cannot take out dividends and also may lose the job 
and be without monetary compensation.  
Yes Owners take responsibility for the firm’s economic development.  
Yes The company is no longer entrepreneurial driven, but by a board.  
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Yes Because you as an owner struggle to make the ends meet all the time. The 
workload is highest, but the increases in salaries only goes to the other employees.  
No Securing strong motivation for the development of the company.  
Yes Because they do not participate in the value development of the company and are 
compensated for this in the form of higher salary.  
No If you have ownership shares in the company, the possible dividends can be 
viewed as a part of compensation.   
No Owners create values in many ways.  
No Does not have the upside of the company`s growth.  
No They do not participate in the value creation in form of increased value of the 
stocks in addition to yearly dividends. Therefore, it is easier to reduce own CEO 
compensation, and a side effect of this is a positive signal-effect to the other 
employees. Indirectly you can therefore also affect the wage level (thus also the 
cost level) in the company.   
 
Q19 - How much do you agree with the following statements about compensation? 










My compensation varies a lot 













Pay is the most important 







































My compensation varies a lot 













Pay is the most important 
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Q20 - What motivates you to do a good job? 
 










































































































Challenges and sense 













Being a positive 

























































































































Challenges and a 













Being a positive 



















A7 – OSLO Shipping Index  
 
Figure 20 – OSLO Shipping Index (Oslo Børs, n.d.) 
